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Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin 
Michael Abramowicz* 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution, an 
alternative to a central bank. The decisions made through this protocol, 
however, involve no judgment. Could a peer-to-peer protocol underpin 
an institution that makes normative decisions? Indeed, an extension to 
the Bitcoin protocol could allow a cryptocurrency to make law. Tacit 
coordination games, in which players compete to identify consensus 
issue resolutions, would determine currency ownership. For example, 
an issue might be whether a cryptocurrency-based trust should disburse 
funds to a putative beneficiary, and the game’s outcome would resolve 
the question and result in gains or losses for coordination game 
participants. A cryptocurrency can also be used to generate rules or 
other written codes. Peer-to-peer law might be useful when official 
decisionmakers are corrupt or when agency or transactions costs are 
high. A modest starting point for cryptocurrency-based governance 
would be as a replacement for Bitcoin’s centralized system for changing 
its source code. A cryptocurrency incorporating tacit coordination 
games could serve as a foundation for other projects requiring peer-to-
peer governance, ranging from arbitration to business associations, 
which would enjoy inherent limited liability and would lack designated 
management. 
                                                 
*
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Bitcoin, described by its promoters as “an innovative payment network and 
a new kind of money,”1 has attracted extraordinary attention for a financial 
innovation.2 This attention results less from the functions that Bitcoin serves, 
operating as a digital medium of exchange and store of value,3 than from the 
                                                 
1
 See BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).   
2
 See, e.g., Rob Wile, 10 Financial Innovations That Are Changing the World More than Bitcoin, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/10-financial-innovations-more-exciting-than-bitcoin-2014-1 (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2014) (identifying innovations in payment technology purportedly more important 
than Bitcoin, despite receiving far less publicity). 
3
 Currencies are generally thought to fulfill these functions and a third, serving as a unit of account. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573788 
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decentralized nature of Bitcoin transactions. Unlike traditional currency and 
financial instruments, Bitcoins are not issued by a central bank. Rather, anyone can 
attempt to “mine” Bitcoins by using computers programmed to guess answers to a 
computational puzzle.4 Bitcoin is thus neither a commodity currency (backed by 
gold or some other commodity) nor a fiat currency (used by convention as a result 
of a legal edict).5 
Bitcoin’s independence from central authorities helps explain the 
perception that it is a technological marvel. Bitcoin functions even though it is a 
protocol without a referee. Of course, other protocols operate with minimal 
supervision; the Internet does not require police officers to arrest those who violate 
the rules of TCP/IP. But what makes Bitcoin remarkable is that it settles that most 
controversial issue—who owns wealth—without need for a law enforcement 
apparatus. Bitcoin can be seen not just as a currency, but more grandly as an 
institution that creates and enforces property rights. It is an institution, however, 
that can resolve only one type of decision – whether purported transfers of Bitcoins 
will be validated and added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block 
chain.6 If this is libertarian nirvana, it may seem to expose the limits of what peer-
to-peer transactions can accomplish. Governments necessarily make normative 
decisions—legislative, executive, and judicial—and Bitcoin transactions involve 
no judgment.  
                                                 
See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 22 (6th ed. 2007). Critics maintain that Bitcoin 
has fulfilled the exchange and value store functions poorly and has not served the unit-of-account 
function at all. See, e.g., David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal (Apr. 
1, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361599 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
Its value is so volatile that few if any commercial parties would agree to denominate contracts in 
Bitcoins. Cf. William J. Luther & Lawrence H. White, Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency? 6 
(George Mason Univ. Dept. of Econ. Working Paper No. 14-17), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446604 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (arguing 
that Bitcoin may succeed as a medium of exchange even if not as a unit of account, if it becomes 
easy to trade in and out of Bitcoin, so that speculative risk can be decoupled from exchange use).  
4
 Mining, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining (last visited Sept. 11, 2014); see also infra 
Part I.C. 
5
 The conventional wisdom of economists is that fiat currency is more stable than commodity 
currency. See, e.g., Christopher Shea, Survey: No Support for Gold Standard Among Top 
Economists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012. Skeptics (often called “goldbugs”) argue that commodity 
currencies’ insulation from political decisionmaking makes them more stable. Some of these 
skeptics believe that Bitcoin’s insulation from politics similarly may in the long term allow for 
relative stability. See, e,g., DETLEV S. SCHLICHTER, PAPER MONEY COLLAPSE: THE FOLLY OF 
ELASTIC MONEY 15-16, 289-300  (2d ed. 2014). 
6
 There is no central repository for this list. It is maintained separately by participating nodes. See 
Block chain, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). This 
is what makes Bitcoin peer-to-peer. 
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The most ambitious attempt to use cryptocurrencies as more general legal 
tools reveal the apparent limits of those strategies. Bitcoin includes a rudimentary 
scripting language7 that in principle permits a contract to be resolved by a third-
party “oracle.” For example, a Bitcoin wiki suggests that a Bitcoin contract could 
allow money to be transferred to a third-party only once the oracle gives 
confirmation that a named individual has died.8 In effect, the oracle serves as an 
escrow agent.9 Bitcoin is a weak substitute for conventional life insurance, 
however, as insurance involves much more than escrow.10 The Ethereum project 
could provide a closer substitute. It aims to create a cryptocurrency allowing 
Turing-complete computations, i.e. classical computer programs of arbitrary 
complexity.11 So, it might be possible to aggregate insurance premiums into a fund 
and make payouts when specified conditions are met. But until computer programs 
can pass the Turing test and exhibit general artificial intelligence, they will still lack 
judgment. They will not, for example, be able to determine whether vague contract 
provisions have been satisfied. Cryptocurrencies cannot solve the problem of 
incomplete contracts,12 and as long as contracts are incomplete, humans will need 
to resolve ambiguities. 
This Article, however, shows that cryptocurrency protocols can be used to 
aggregate human judgment and thus to make legal decisions. Just as a 
cryptocurrency need not identify a central banker who maintains transaction 
                                                 
7
 See Script, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
8
 Contracts—Example 4: Using external state, BITCOIN WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_4:_Using_external_state (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) 
If the oracle determines that a condition is met, it produces a digital signature needed to complete 
the transaction. 
9
 The wiki also gives a separate example of an escrow transaction in which a client’s funds are 
placed in escrow under terms such that the money can be sent to the merchant if both the client and 
merchant agree (completing the purchase), to the client if both agree (refunding the amount, perhaps 
because of a problem with delivery), or to the merchant (if the merchant and the mediator agree). 
Contracts—Example 2: Escrow and dispute mediation, BITCOIN WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_2:_Escrow_and_dispute_mediation (last visited Sept. 
11, 2014).  
10
 See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1986). 
11
 White Paper: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, 
GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
12
 Contracts are incomplete in part because some contingencies are not anticipated, but also because 
parties leave them deliberately incomplete, either because the contracts are self-enforcing or because 
people believe that norms of fairness will help resolve disputes. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003). A cryptocurrency that can 
exercise normative judgment can be seen as a mechanism that makes a contract self-enforcing or as 
a mechanism that avoids judicial enforcement through peer-to-peer decisionmaking. 
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records, so too would a cryptocurrency not need to identify specific people 
responsible for making a decision. Cryptocurrencies, in other words, can 
crowdsource decisionmaking.13 Crude mechanisms for crowdsourcing 
decisionmaking already exist; consider, for example, Internet polls. A 
cryptocurrency relying similarly on counting votes would be similarly unreliable. 
The principle of “one person, one vote”14 cannot be implemented with any currency 
that allows anonymous ownership. An alternative would be voting based on Bitcoin 
interest.15 But such a system, or one allowing vote-buying,16 would give greater 
influence to those with more Bitcoins. 
 A better approach is to design a system in which the cryptocurrency 
protocol implements what game theorists call a “tacit coordination game.”17 In 
Thomas Schelling’s famous tacit coordination game experiment, a subject must 
plan to meet another subject in New York City the next day, but without advance 
coordination of time and place.18 Schelling’s survey indicated that most would meet 
at the Grand Central Terminal information booth at noon.19 A similar tacit 
coordination game could give each participant the goal of answering a question in 
the same way as later participants will answer the same question. Participants would 
seek focal point solutions, much like the prospective rendez-vousers in New York. 
The answer to the question posed is the most logical focal point. For example, 
imagine asking someone on the street whether it is “cold” or “hot” outside, and 
informing her that she will receive $10 if the next person to whom you ask the same 
question (with the same deal) answers in the same way. Reporting her true 
evaluation of the weather—or, better yet, what she expects would be the average 
person’s evaluation of the average person’s evaluation of the weather—is a better 
strategy than answering at random. 
                                                 
13
 See generally JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE 
FUTURE OF BUSINESS (2009) (providing other examples of crowdsourcing by businesses). 
14
 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”). 
15
 See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the use of such voting by the cryptocurrency 
NXT). 
16
 See infra note 141-146 and accompanying text. 
17
 See, e.g., John Van Huyck et al., Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and 
Coordination Failure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 234 (1990).  
18
 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-56 (1980). Schelling coined the phrase 
“tacit coordination game.” Id. at 54. 
19
 Id. at 56. 
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 The possibility that tacit coordination games could be used to address 
normative questions has been recognized previously.20 But the prior literature has 
imagined that some central authority has organized the tacit coordination game, 
performing tasks such as compensating the winners.21 This poses a significant 
barrier to using a tacit coordination game for legal purposes, even in enforcing a 
voluntary contract. Even if contracting parties were to agree that their disputes 
should be resolved by a tacit coordination game, the courts might refuse to enforce 
such a contract. A tacit coordination game is not a recognized means of conducting 
arbitration,22 and besides, it seems to be similar to gambling.23 
 With cryptocurrencies, using tacit coordination games to resolve contracts 
becomes viable. A cryptocurrency protocol could implement the tacit coordination 
game, so no central authority is needed to coordinate it. The protocol could establish 
the gains and losses of players (functioning as judges of the questions before them), 
and the result of the game could determine the ownership of cryptocurrency, for 
example held in escrow. Ordinarily, the government can thwart certain types of 
contracts by refusing to enforce those contracts,24 but cryptocurrency contracts can 
be self-enforcing. The government might regulate payments into or out of the 
cryptocurrency25 or regulate contracting parties directly. This is feasible, especially 
because cryptocurrency contracts might need to be public so they can be judged, 
but governments may hesitate to regulate parties entering into voluntary contracts.26 
                                                 
20
 See Michael Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533 (2001). 
21
 One commentator has proposed using a tacit coordination game for a particular purpose in Bitcoin, 
but this proposal cannot be extended to more general normative questions. See infra note 169. 
22
 The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires agreements for mandatory arbitration to be 
enforced. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going 
Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 
182 (2000). But an arbitration provision may not be enforced when “a waiver of judicial remedies 
inherently conflicts with the underlying purposes of that other statute.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989). Some courts have thus refused to enforce 
arbitration agreements where the agreement seemed unduly one-sided. See, e.g., Hooters v. Phillips, 
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). A peer-to-peer arbitration provision might be voided if the courts are 
uncomfortable with it. 
23
 See Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 541-56. Such a game might be considered to be a “game of 
skill” and thus exempt from regulation. Cf. Steven D. Levitt et al., Is Texas Hold ‘Em a Game of 
Chance? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581 (2013) (criticizing the courts’ approach 
to distinguishing games of chance and skill). 
24
 See generally Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1445 (2006) (assessing the justification for deterring contracts by refusing to enforce them). 
25
 The government attacks Internet gambling in much the same way. See Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006). 
26
 In the Internet gambling context, for example, enforcement has been focused on the operators of 
gaming companies, not individual gamblers, though this has partly been because of ambiguity as to 
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 This Article’s ambition is to describe the possibility of peer-to-peer law, not 
to argue that it is desirable. Traditional legal institutions have obvious advantages. 
Representative government is valuable both because political deliberation can 
improve decisions27 and because democratic participation enhances legitimacy.28 A 
full analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutions is well beyond 
this Article’s scope, but peer-to-peer law is most plausible where existing 
decisionmaking mechanisms are most flawed, for example where corruption is 
endemic. Peer-to-peer decisionmakers have incentives to combat self-interested 
decisionmaking. Similarly, peer-to-peer law could be helpful when agency costs 
are especially high, as may be the case with some corporate decisionmaking, or if 
decisionmakers are relatively uninformed, or should bureaucracy or litigation 
impose unnecessary transaction costs on relatively simple decisions. Peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking could emerge in niche legal contexts. This could provide data and 
experience about the relative advantages and disadvantages of such decisionmaking 
relative to more conventional decisionmaking. 
Peer-to-peer law is most plausible as a mechanism of voluntary private 
ordering. The strongest defense against the argument that Bitcoin is inherently 
worthless29 is that there exists (or in the future may exist30) demand for peer-to-peer 
transactions. Each element of this defense also suggests demand for peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking. First, government regulation might impose transactions costs, and 
a cryptocurrency may be able to evade such regulation.31 Similarly, peer-to-peer 
                                                 
whether individuals commit illegal acts by gambling online. See Jason A. Miller, Don’t Bet on This 
Legislation, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 185, 211-12 (2008). 
27
 See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: 
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (discussing how 
ideal deliberation can enhance legitimacy). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (documenting that deliberation can sometimes 
promote polarization). 
28
 See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 505-06 (2011) (discussing the significance of the norm of 
political participation). 
29
 See Alex Crippen, Buffett Blasts Bitcoin as ‘Mirage’, CNBC, Mar. 14, 2014 (video), available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101494937) (reporting Warren Buffett’s skepticism). 
30
 Anticipated future value is what makes Bitcoin valuable today. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Why 
I’m Investing in Bitcoins (Updated), VOX, (Sept. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/5/6086171/why-im-investing-in-bitcoins (estimating Bitcoin’s value 
based on the anticipated number of transactions in the future). The uncertainty about future value, 
however, contributes to Bitcoin’s volatility. See, e.g., Jon Southurst, Bitcoin Price Continues to Fall, 
Breaks $200 Mark, COINDESK (Jan. 14, 2015), available at http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-
continues-fall-breaks-200-mark/ (noting that Bitcoin had lost over 80% of its value in a year). 
31
 Cryptocurrency proponents argue that Bitcoin might thus someday serve as an effective system 
of micropayments. See Campbell R. Harvey, Cryptofinance (2014), 
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decisionmaking might reduce litigation costs. Second, some people may have an 
ideological preference, based on some form of libertarianism, anti-corporatism, or 
anarchism, for using Bitcoin.32 If someday it is just as easy to enter into transactions 
with Bitcoin as with MasterCard,33 then this preference can be cheaply indulged, as 
could a preference for nongovernmental decisionmaking. Third, a cryptocurrency 
could provide privacy protections, which both law-abiding citizens and criminals 
may have reasons to value privacy.34 Currently, Bitcoin transactions can sometimes 
be traced,35 though proposed changes to Bitcoin36 and alternative cryptocurrencies37 
provide much stronger privacy protection.  
The typical defense of a decision’s legitimacy identifies the decision as an 
output of some recognized governmental or even private body, but some may 
perceive legitimacy to derive from an absence of individual control. As long as the 
output is recognizable, this can be seen as consistent with legal positivism.38 Even 
social customs can serve as an authoritative source of law, at least under many 
versions of positivism.39 But the possibility of peer-to-peer decisionmaking 
                                                 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2438299; see also Daniel Cawrey, The Promise of Bitcoin Micropayments: 
Corporations, Incentives and Altcoins, COINDESK (Feb. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.coindesk.com/promise-bitcoin-micropayments-corporations-incentives-altcoins/ (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
32
 See Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, at SR12. 
33
 See Bitcoin’s Four Hurdles: Part One—Usability, June 4, 2011. 
34
 See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007). 
35
 See Tom Simonite, Mapping the Bitcoin Economy Could Reveal Users’ Identities, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518816/mapping-the-bitcoin-
economy-could-reveal-users-identities/. 
36
 See, e.g., Tim Ruffing et al., CoinShuffle: Practical Decentralized Coin Mixing for Bitcoin, 
https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Ruffing.pdf (last viewed Sept. 11, 2014). 
37
 See, e.g., Darkcoin, DARKCOIN WIKI http://wiki.darkcoin.eu/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Nov. 
9, 2014) (providing an overview of a cryptocurrency called DarkCoin, relying on a technology 
called DarkSend that prevents transactions from appearing in a public block chain). 
38
 For a useful summary of positivism and its variants, see Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, 
Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1140-44 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITISM 
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). Positivist theory indicates that law’s content is a social fact. 
Id. at 1141.  Ordinarily, the relevant social fact might be whether a particular institution (such as the 
legislature) has made a particular decision, but the occurrence of a peer-to-peer decision also could 
be social fact. 
39
 Whether this is in tension with positivism, however, depends on the particular version of 
positivism. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, 48 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 507, 519 (2013) (noting that “there is no reason in many versions of positivism why 
custom could not be a source of law,” though “narrow Austinian-style positivism that identifies law 
with commands of a sovereign does not naturally look at custom as a source of the law”). 
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challenges the conventional assumption that centralized institutions (such as 
legislatures and courts) are needed to produce law of sufficient clarity to be 
workable. Justice Holmes insisted that “[t]he common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky, but the articular voice of some sovereign or quasi 
sovereign that can be identified.”40 This Article, however, suggests that law can be 
produced by non-sovereigns competing to discern the brooding omnipresence of 
the best answers to normative legal questions. 
 The dawn of cryptocurrency-based law is not near. There are serious 
obstacles to its emergence, including the need for experimentation with tacit 
coordination games to establish that participants will seek to address the normative 
questions posed.41 There is, however, a natural test case for cryptocurrency-based 
tacit coordination games. They could be used to make (or merely recommend) 
decisions necessary for effective operation of Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency. 
The Bitcoin protocol, ironically, is coordinated in the same centralized manner as 
other open source projects.42 A few people decide whether to accept pull requests 
on the source code.43 It is sometimes said that Bitcoin is decentralized because 
anyone can fork44 the Bitcoin code and create a new cryptocurrency.45 But this is a 
bit like saying that colonial governments were not centralized because anyone could 
move to the wilderness and form their own governments. Open source is not 
inherently peer-to-peer. A cryptocurrency is a natural testing ground for peer-to-
peer decisionmaking because the existence of centralized decisionmaking is at odds 
with the broader goals of the alternative currency movement. 
 Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could be used to determine whether to make 
changes to the Bitcoin reference code. This modest application of peer-to-peer law 
would allow the institution of Bitcoin to respond to the challenges it faces. An 
existential risk to Bitcoin is that some other cryptocurrency could emerge as 
                                                 
40
 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
41
 See infra Part II.A.2. 
42
 For a critique of Bitcoin as insufficiently decentralized, see Arthur Gervais et al., Is Bitcoin a 
Decentralized Currency? (2013), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/829.pdf (last visited Sept. 
11, 2014). 
43
 See Alec Liu, Who’s Building Bitcoin? An Inside Look at Bitcoin’s Open Source Development, 
VICE http://motherboard.vice.com/en_au/blog/whos-building-bitcoin-an-inside-look-at-bitcoins-
open-source-development (describing the development process and naming the developers with 
“push rights”). 
44
 For a description of forking and an argument that the possibility of forking constrains those 
supervising open-source projects to take into account community views, see Linus Nyman & Juho 
Lindman, Code Forking, Governance, and Sustainability in Open Source Software, TECH. 
INNOVATION MGMT. REV., Jan. 2013, at 7. 
45
 See How to Fork Bitcoin and Build Own Cryptocurrency, STACKEXCHANGE 
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/19287/how-to-fork-bitcoin-and-build-own-
cryptocurrency (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
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dominant, and inclusion of peer-to-peer decisionmaking could bolster either 
Bitcoin or a competitor. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking also could be useful in 
conducting other currency-related activities. For example, it could be used to 
resolve any disputes about whether blocks of transactions should be added to the 
block chain. This is the central task performed by Bitcoin miners, and development 
of a reliable alternative system could save resources. These resources in turn might 
be used to reward activities that promote the currency, such as provision of liquidity 
to stabilize the currency, lobbying, developing source code, or suggesting useful 
improvements to the cryptocurrency). Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could be used 
to decide whether to reward those engaging in such activities with newly minted 
currency. 
 Part I of this Article will introduce the concept of peer-to-peer governance 
by identifying its three critical components: a decentralized ledger, a decentralized 
decision, and a decentralized fisc. Bitcoin has each of these, but its capacity to make 
decentralized decisions is limited, and its fiscal power is restricted to supporting 
mining activity. Part II explains how formal tacit coordination games can be played 
using transactions on the Bitcoin block chain and how the results of such games 
could transform Bitcoin into a genuine peer-to-peer institution, with a much more 
flexible decisionmaking apparatus. Finally, Part III examines the potential role for 
peer-to-peer decisionmaking in the legal system, focusing on private law (including 
voluntary arbitration and trusts), but also considering the possibility of public law 
institutions built on Bitcoin, most plausibly a central bank. 
I. THE THREE CORNERSTONES OF PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “peer-to-peer” as “designating or 
relating to a network in which each computer can act as a server for the others, 
allowing shared access to files and other resources.”46 The most familiar context, 
technological and legal, is peer-to-peer filesharing,47 where the absence of a central 
server eliminates the need for intermediaries to store files being shared and 
frustrates the ability of the government to stop copyright violations.48 Peer-to-peer 
governance, then, might be defined as a system of decisionmaking generally 
                                                 
46
Peer-to-peer definition, OED.COM, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/139725?redirectedFrom=peer-to-peer#eid31476999 (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2014). 
47
 See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (allowing suit against 
companies that created peer-to-peer software for inducing copyright infringement). 
48
 See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 726-45 (2003) (explaining the 
development of peer-to-peer filesharing as a mechanism of interest group behavior designed to 
minimize legal costs). 
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regarded as authoritative even though it lacks a centrally designated authority or 
authorities to make and enforce decisions. The United States includes centrally 
designated authorities (the legislature, the executive, and the judicial branch), so it 
is not peer-to-peer governance. A state of anarchy, moreover, is not peer-to-peer 
governance, because while it may lack centrally designated authorities, it does not 
produce authoritative rules or adjudications.49 Perhaps there are boundary cases, 
such as social norms and practices that function like legal institutions.50 But Lisa 
Bernstein’s diamond merchants have formalized systems of arbitration,51 and Bob 
Ellickson’s ranchers rely substantially on unwritten rules rather than on an 
alternative system of creating legislation.52 For rules and adjudications to be 
authoritative, they generally must be in writing,53 and familiar institutions either 
have centralized processes for lawmaking or function without relying on 
authoritative written law. 
There are thus only limited precedents for peer-to-peer governance before 
Bitcoin, which engages in peer-to-peer governance of a limited sort. The Bitcoin 
protocol does produce written decisions—recording transfers of property rights and 
granting new property rights to Bitcoin miners who successfully solve hash 
problems—without designating any central authority to produce or even to store 
the decisions. But Bitcoin is a rather feeble system of peer-to-peer governance, 
because Bitcoin cannot produce open-ended rules (whether written in natural or 
computer language). Bitcoin does require important multidimensional decisions 
about how the protocol should evolve, and humans make those decisions based on 
arguments and written discussion,54 but these decisions are made by a centralized 
                                                 
49
 Anarchism, however, does not necessarily entail the rejection of all authority. See generally PAUL 
MCLAUGHLIN, ANARCHISM AND AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL 
ANARCHISM (2007).  
50
 Norms can have large effects on behavior, but because they are contestable and can change. For 
an account of changes in social norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 U. MICH. L. REV. 338, 391-400 (1997). 
51
 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Constractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-30 (1992) (describing a highly developed system of 
arbitration that serves as an alternative to legal enforcement). 
52
 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). The ranchers do recognize the existence of central authorities, 
and will occasionally complain to their elected bounty supervisors. See id. at 680. 
53
 Jed Rubenfeld argues that writenness is central to the case for judicial supremacy. See JED 
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 163-68 
(2001). 
54
 See, e.g., BIP Proposal: Eliminate No-Fee Transactions in Bitcoin, BITCOIN TALK (Sept. 15, 
2014), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=150194.0 (providing discussion of a Bitcoin 
Improvement Proposal). 
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group with power to modify a particular version of the Bitcoin software code 
repository generally regarded as authoritative.55 The Bitcoin source code is created 
as an open source project, but any particular fork of an open-source project has a 
central repository and is thus not itself peer-to-peer. Bitcoin, in short, has peer-to-
peer governance for approving transactions, but not for approving changes to 
Bitcoin. 
This Part describes the essential components of a robust system of peer-to-
peer governance, capable of generating rules in natural or computer language and 
of providing incentives to reward those who enforce those rules or otherwise 
advance the interests of the institution. The three essential components are a 
decentralized ledger for recording decisions, a decentralized means of making 
decisions, and a decentralized fiscal power. It argues that these form a three-legged 
stool, with each benefiting from a robust version of the other two. A decentralized 
ledger can’t work and is of little use without decentralized decisionmaking (at least 
as to whether a purported ledger is valid) and spending. A decentralized tool for 
making decisions is but philosophy if those decisions cannot be recorded in an 
authoritative way outside anyone’s control or if there is no means of enforcing those 
decisions with financial incentives. And the ability to spend money cannot be 
exercised if there is no means to decide how to spend it or to record such decisions. 
A cryptocurrency is but one example of a possible peer-to-peer institution, 
but it is a critical example, because it enables the decentralized fiscal power, and so 
this Part will elaborate on the three essential components by focusing on 
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin has a decentralized ledger (though only for transactions), 
decentralized decisionmaking (though only for a very particular type of decision), 
and a decentralized fiscal power (but only to reward a specific type of activity). But 
its advances point the way to the possibility of a true peer-to-peer governance 
institution, built on extensions to the Bitcoin protocol or to similar cryptocurrency 
protocols and capable of performing tasks more complex than keeping track of 
currency transactions. The core extension needed is the facility to play tacit 
coordination games based on normative questions.  
It may seem odd to imagine building a cryptocurrency on a tacit 
coordination game, but in fact each of Bitcoin’s components already depends on 
tacit coordination. As a recent economic analysis of Bitcoin notes, “Participants 
must maintain consensus (1) on the rules to determine validity of transactions, (2) 
on which transactions have occurred in the system, and (3) that the currency has 
value.”56 These three challenges correspond to the three powers to be discussed 
                                                 
55
 See Bitcoin, GITHUB https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (providing 
official Bitcoin source code). 
56
 Joshua A. Kroll et al., The Economics of Bitcoin Mining or, Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries 
2 (2013), available at 
http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf. 
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here. Bitcoin’s decentralized ledger requires consensus on the rules for whether a 
transaction is valid; Bitcoin’s decentralized decision involves tacit coordination 
about which collection of individually valid transactions is the complete and 
authoritative one; and Bitcoin can exercise its decentralized fiscal power to reward 
miners only because there is a consensus that cryptocurrencies in general and 
Bitcoin in particular are valuable. This section describes these forms of tacit 
coordination, illustrating the tale of how Bitcoin works from a new perspective. 
A. The Decentralized Ledger 
Some have argued that the writtenness of the Constitution mandates 
particular forms of interpretation or judicial review.57 Even critics of that claim 
acknowledge that writing serves important legal functions.58 Among those is that 
“the text serves as a focal point for legal coordination.”59 Absent land records, for 
example, it would be difficult to coordinate concerning use of land. Similarly, 
although statutes and judicial decisions could exist without recording, the written 
record reduces the risk of distortion of legislative intent or judicial doctrine. With 
land, expensive title searches are needed to verify the extent of rights,60 and the risk 
of fraud requires insurance.61 It is possible, however, to ascertain the literal content 
of most legal decisions cheaply and with near certainty. Disputes concern their 
implications and meaning. 
The central technological advance of Bitcoin is the invention of the block 
chain, which tracks decisions of owners of Bitcoins. A typical decision is a transfer 
of Bitcoins from one user (identified by a Bitcoin address) to another user (similarly 
identified),62 though more complicated transactions are possible.63 The block chain 
                                                 
57
 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 635 (1999) 
(“[A] proper respect for the writtenness of the text means that those committed to this Constitution 
have no choice but to respect the original meaning of its text until it is formally amended in 
writing.”).  
58
 Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1025, 1047-70 (2010). 
59
 Id. at 1048. 
60
 Ordinarily, it is optimal not to search too far in the past, even though this means that title will not 
be established with certainty. See Matthew Baker et al., Optimal Title Search, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
139 (2002). 
61
 See, e.g., David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of 
Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 398-99 (2012) (noting that title insurance 
covers fraud concerning the chain of title). 
62
 A Bitcoin address is generally a randomly generated string of characters. See Address, BITCOIN 
WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
63
 See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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includes only transactions that are verified as legitimate. One can ascertain a 
prospective transaction’s legitimacy as of the most recent block chain update by 
examining the block chain to determine the number of Bitcoins associated with the 
originating address. Though designed specifically for currency transactions, the 
block chain is a tool of general applicability, and at least one alternative currency 
is designed with the purpose of enabling metadata to be stored in transactions in its 
block chain.64 Thus in principle, a block chain can be an authoritative, 
chronologically ordered record of any type of legal decision. 
Any database can store records chronologically. What differentiates the 
block chain is that it is a database with no central repository. Any number of copies 
of the block chain may exist, and the Bitcoin protocol is designed to ensure that 
they are in sync, or more precisely that they are eventually consistent65 in that 
temporary deviations are resolved over time. This should work even if 
noncooperative individuals seek to falsify the block chain to their own advantage, 
for example to allow them to spend their Bitcoins twice or more. The block chain 
may function even if some subset of the servers fail, for example because of natural 
disaster or governmental interference. Thus, if an authoritative written record of all 
decisions is a prerequisite for effective governance, the block chain is a mechanism 
that satisfies this requirement peer-to-peer. 
The most significant prior art underlying the block chain is public key 
cryptography. A mathematical technique can be used to quickly generate two keys 
of a specific length (say, 256 bits). One of the keys can used to scramble a 
communication, and the other key can then unscramble it.66 This can be used to 
authenticate documents. A hash function can create a short code from a document, 
essentially a fingerprint.67 The authenticator then scrambles (encrypts) this code 
using the private key. The public key can be used to decrypt it, producing the 
original hash. Thus, anyone who knows the relevant algorithms and the public key 
can determine, with extremely high confidence, that someone who knew the private 
key corresponding to the public key must have performed the encryption. The only 
way to determine the private key from the public key is to guess, and this would 
take eons.68 The production of the encrypted code is taken to signify agreement with 
                                                 
64
 See FLORINCOIN, http://florincoin.org/florincoin.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
65
 See generally Werner Vogels, Eventually Consistent, 52 COMMUNICATIONS OF ACM 40 (2009), 
available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1435417.1435432 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) 
(explaining eventually consistency in database design). 
66
 See generally UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 149-73 (2011) (providing an overview of symmetric key cryptography). 
67
 See, e.g., Ralph C. Losey, HASH: The New Bates Stamp, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 12-16 (2007) 
(providing an accessible introduction to hashing). 
68
 Id. at 156-57 (discussing the relationship of key lengths to the difficulty of guessing keys). With 
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the content of the document. A Bitcoin address is a public key, and a transaction 
must be signed with the private key corresponding to that public key. 
A computer can verify a digital signature quickly,69 and this simplifies 
construction of the block chain. It is trivial to confirm the legitimacy of all 
transactions that led to particular Bitcoins being owned by the person purporting to 
transfer them. No one could create a block chain with fake transfers or unauthorized 
transactions, because any collection of transactions can be easily verified. That is, 
anyone can easily confirm that a holder of a private key corresponding to the public 
key that sent the Bitcoins approved the transaction. The challenge that the block 
chain overcomes is different—the danger that an authorized transaction will be 
omitted from the block chain. If one could spend Bitcoins but keep this transaction 
off the block chain, then one might be able to spend those Bitcoins again.70 
Bitcoin addresses the problem in part by adding transactions in ordered 
groups, called blocks. Bitcoin provides incentives, to be discussed in the next 
section, for miners to periodically create these blocks, but it makes this difficult to 
do, sufficiently difficult that a new block will be created on average only every 10 
minutes.71 The blocks are linked by hashes. When a block is added, a hash function 
produces a hash based on fields including the previous block’s hash and the 
transactions on the new block. Thus, it is not possible to omit a block or a 
transaction on a block without changing the hash on all subsequent blocks. Thus, if 
one knows of a particular previous legitimate transaction and the hash of its block,72 
one can verify the legitimacy of all transactions reported on the block chain up to 
that block. It is not possible with a reasonable amount of computer time to create a 
series of fake transactions that will result in a hash that exactly matches the real 
hash.73 If the blocks in the block chain are not properly linked, then the client 
software will recognize the block chain as fake. Each client will reject such a block 
                                                 
a 256-bit key, there are 2256 combinations, more than a 1 followed by 77 zeros. 
69
 For example, one public key signature system can verify 71,000 signatures per second on an 
ordinary quad-core processor. See Ed25519: High-Speed High-Security Signatures (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
70
 A recipient of payments might defend against this by waiting to perform its side of the contract 
(such as transferring goods) until the new payment was confirmed on the block chain, preferably 
some blocks before the most recent one. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the 
possibility that the synchronization process might lead to the removal of some blocks from the block 
chain).  
71
 This time period was selected apparently arbitrarily in the original Bitcoin paper. See Satoshi 
Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 4 (2008), available at 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
72
 Client software tracks some previous transactions, designated as “checkpoints.” See infra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
73
 See, e.g., Losey, supra note 67, at 17-18 (discussing the irreversibility of hash functions). 
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chain because those programming and hosting client software know that others will 
reject such a block chain as fake. 
This provides a preliminary illustration of tacit coordination’s centrality to 
Bitcoin. Anyone could fork the block chain and make a client with some other set 
of rules, for example deleting some previously accepted transactions because the 
Bitcoins were reported stolen.74 If this fork were widely accepted, then the Bitcoin 
protocol could change to include this ad hoc list of exceptions to the general 
principles. This seems highly unlikely, however, because even if there is a strong 
normative argument for this change, there is also a strong argument, grounded in 
the need to protect Bitcoin’s stability, against ad hoc exceptions. When, however, 
the authoritative Bitcoin software repository changes the rules of Bitcoin, as it often 
does,75 these changes have been widely accepted, at least so far. Revolution always 
remains possible, however, and for sufficiently strong reasons, the tacit 
coordination game could someday lead to many or all Bitcoin users accepting some 
other set of rules, even rules other than those respected by the software in the 
generally recognized official repository. 
B. The Decentralized Decision 
The mechanism as described so far does not address the risk that two miners 
will simultaneously add different blocks, some containing one transaction and some 
containing another. This won’t happen often because of design decisions to be 
covered in the next section that make it difficult to create a valid block, but it is 
always possible. Bitcoin needs a system for determining which is the authoritative 
block chain. It resolves this with a coordination rule. The valid block chain is 
considered to be the block chain that required the most work to form,76 which will 
generally be the longest block chain.77 So, once another miner adds a block to one 
of the block chains, that becomes the longest, and anyone aware of this block 
                                                 
74
 For example, the Bitcoin protocol could have been changed to nullify a large theft. Cf. Timothy 
B. Lee, Hackers Allegedly Stole $400 Million in Bitcoins. Here’s How to Catch Them, WASHINGTON 
POST BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/02/28/hackers-allegedly-stole-400-million-in-bitcoins-heres-how-to-catch-them/. 
75
 See Releases, GITHUB https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/releases (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) 
(providing a list of Bitcoin software releases). 
76
 See http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/936/how-does-a-client-decide-which-is-the-
longest-block-chain-if-there-is-a-fork (explaining that block chains are compared based on their 
score target). 
77
 The longest block chain might not be the authoritative one if someone sought to create a new 
block chain from scratch. One could easily falsify a block chain containing a large number of blocks, 
but it would be clear that the level of difficulty of adding a block to this block chain was low, and it 
would be rejected in favor of the authentic block chain. 
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chain’s existence will ignore the other block chain. Of course, blocks could be 
simultaneously added again, but the coordination rule and the difficulty of adding 
blocks according to a set schedule ensures that eventually, one block chain will 
emerge as the consensus longest one. The coordination rule is akin to the intuition 
that the time to meet someone in New York without communication is noon. One 
can imagine an infinite number of functions that would determine which is the 
better block chain, but the longest block chain rule stands out as particularly salient. 
Bitcoin’s approach to this issue means that decisionmaking is not 
instantaneous. It could not be. Public key cryptography can provide near instant 
verification that the owner of Bitcoins (or, more precisely, a holder of the private 
key associated with the public key address) has authorized their transfer or a 
particular script that ultimately may lead to their transfer,78 but the possibility that 
someone might make two such transfers simultaneously means that instant 
confirmation is impossible. A merchant who wishes to confirm that a transaction 
with Bitcoin is valid must not only wait for the transaction to be added to the block 
chain, but indeed wait long enough to ensure that this block chain remains the 
authoritative one. In theory, even after several blocks have been added, it is possible 
that some longer block chain could emerge, but empirically, this is highly 
unlikely,79 especially if no competing block chain has yet emerged. 
The fear that an inconsistent block chain might emerge at some later time, 
along with a desire to facilitate quick rejection of long block chains that required 
only small amounts of effort to create,80 has led to the addition of another 
mechanism for identifying the valid block chain: checkpointing.81 A checkpoint is 
a record of the block chain hash as of a certain point in time, and the Bitcoin 
reference software itself records checkpoints that must be included in the block 
chain for it to be valid.82 Thus, if the new software is generally accepted, then it is 
                                                 
78
 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Bitcoin scripts). 
79
 The largest number of blocks that were added to a version of the block chain before being 
orphaned as a result of a longer chain emerging is four blocks, as of this writing. See What is the 
longest blockchain fork that has been orphaned to date, STACKEXCHANGE 
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/3343/what-is-the-longest-blockchain-fork-that-has-
been-orphaned-to-date (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). Presumably, however, the vast majority or all 
transactions in the orphaned blocks were still ultimately incorporated in the block chain.  
80
 Checkpointing is motivated by a need to combat denial-of-service attacks, in which attackers 
present artificially constructed block chains that are longer than the authentic block chain but 
required less effort to create. See What Are Checkpoints in Bitcoin Code?, BITCOIN TALK, 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=194078.35;wap2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
81
 For a discussion of checkpointing, including complaints by some that it is inconsistent with peer-
to-peer decisionmaking, see https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=194078.0.  
82
 See, e.g., Add a new checkpoint at block 295,000, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/4541/commits (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (adding a new 
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impossible for any transactions older than the checkpoint to be reversed. 
Checkpointing represents a deviation from a pure peer-to-peer system, because the 
checkpoint is the result of a decision by the authoritative Bitcoin software designers 
that it is wise, all things considered, to add this safety device. These decisions may 
themselves result from a type of focal point coordination—general agreement in 
the community that a checkpoint should be added—but it is still a centralized 
decision. One commentator has argued that checkpointing is essential as a practical 
matter, but that decentralized currencies are therefore impossible.83 
Checkpointing can be seen as a reflection of the limits of the Bitcoin 
decision mechanism. The mechanism can be used to make only one type of 
decision, and the developers of Bitcoin do not trust the protocol entirely even to 
make that decision without the help of another mechanism that is the direct product 
of human judgment. Those human judgments are thus hard-coded into the protocol 
itself. There is nothing inherently wrong with adding a small centralized component 
to a peer-to-peer protocol, just as there is nothing inherently wrong with running 
any non-peer-to-peer web service. But it shows that even in Bitcoin, there is a 
perception that centralized dictates can be useful to ensure continued successful 
coordination and will be broadly accepted by the relevant community. If Bitcoin 
had a system for aggregating human judgment, it might still include checkpointing, 
because checkpointing makes it easier to identify a valid version of the block chain, 
but the decisions to add checkpoints might be made peer-to-peer instead of as a 
result of a centralized software update. 
C. The Decentralized Fisc 
The most celebrated and controversial aspect of the Bitcoin protocol is the 
incentive that Bitcoin uses to ensure that blocks are generated at regular intervals. 
The incentive is financial. Bitcoin provides a reward for generating a block of 
transactions to add to the end of the block chain. The “miner” who generates a block 
receives some quantity of Bitcoin, though not from any other individual. Mining 
creates new Bitcoins that the protocol recognizes as valid. The size of the reward is 
fixed according to a schedule, with the number of new Bitcoins decreasing 
approximately 50% every four years.84 A miner also can receive any transaction 
fees from transferors of Bitcoins who voluntarily include these fees in their 
transactions to encourage miners to include their transactions.85 Thus, the miners 
                                                 
checkpoint). 
83
 See Ben Laurie, Decentralised Currencies Are Probably Impossible: But Let’s At Least Make 
Them Efficient (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.links.org/files/decentralised-currencies.pdf. 
84
 See https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply (illustrating the schedule) 
85
 Transaction fees, Bitcoin Wiki, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_fees (last visited Nov. 20, 
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are engaged in an activity (adding blocks) that is socially useful to the Bitcoin 
community, and Bitcoin incentivizes miners to engage in this activity by granting 
new Bitcoins. Because Bitcoins are valuable, the Bitcoin protocol is able to provide 
financial incentives in a peer-to-peer way.  
This would be straightforward if confirming transactions were an inherently 
expensive activity. If, for example, it took a great deal of computer power to arrange 
transactions in a block, confirm their digital signatures, and calculate a new hash 
value, then the reward for the Bitcoin miners could be explained by the difficulty 
of their task. In fact, however, this is trivial. The danger is not that too few miners 
would confirm transactions and add them to the block chain but that too many 
would and that some might intentionally omit transactions. So, the Bitcoin protocol 
makes it artificially difficult to mine blocks. A block can be added to the block 
chain only if the block’s hash results in a number lower than a specified target.86 
Under the Bitcoin protocol, this target will fluctuate depending on the success of 
miners so that on average a block is added once every 10 minutes.87 If over time 
more miners enter Bitcoin and computer hardware improves,88 the target falls.  
Bitcoin miners are thus engaging in an activity that is useful to the Bitcoin 
community, but only an infinitesimal portion of the computing power is used to 
generate digital signatures. As of this writing, the target is so low that it begins with 
16 zeros.89 A miner hoping to win Bitcoins collects some set of transactions and 
fills out the fields of the block record, including a field containing the hash value 
of the previous block and a field containing a nonce.90 The nonce can be any 32-bit 
                                                 
2014). A small transaction fee is required for very small transfers of Bitcoins; this mechanisms is 
designed to discourage Bitcoin “dust” or “spam” from filling the block chain. See BITCOIN FEES, 
http://bitcoinfees.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).  Most clients will also ordinarily not include in 
a block larger transactions that do not include some transaction fees, though if a block does include 
such transactions, other clients will consider it to be a legitimate part of the block chain. 
86
 For the current target, in hexadecimal form, see Hextarget, BLOCK EXPLORER, 
http://blockexplorer.com/q/hextarget (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).  
87
 See supra note 71. 
88
 Bitcoin miners today generally use specialized hardware that can calculate hashes much more 
quickly than general purpose computers. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Custom Chips Could Be the 
Shovels in a Bitcoin Gold Rush, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 5, 2012) 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/508061/custom-chips-could-be-the-shovels-in-a-bitcoin-
gold-rush/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
89
 The value as of this writing is 
00000000000000003AAEA2000000000000000000000000000000000000000000. Thus, the 
probability of any single hash being successful is less than 1 in 1616, or approximately 1.8 * 1019 
(i.e., 18 billion billion).  
90
 See Cryptographic Nonce, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_nonce (defining a 
“nonce” as “an arbitrary number used only once in a cryptographic communication”). 
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value of a certain size, and so the miner’s strategy is to try many nonce values, 
calculating the block hash for each one, hoping to produce a hash less than the 
target. A miner must decide what transactions to include before attempting a hash, 
but the miner has an affirmative reason to include all transactions with positive 
transaction fees, and no reason to exclude transactions.91 Sometimes, miners 
include even transactions without transaction fees, perhaps because this contributes 
to the general welfare of Bitcoin from which they benefit.92 
Bitcoin mining thus may largely be characterized as rent-seeking,93 and just 
as the expected investments of ships searching for buried treasure will generally 
average about the value of the treasure,94 in equilibrium one should expect the cost 
of mining to equal the number of Bitcoins that miners receive. Rent-seeking can be 
socially wasteful, but it is not inherently. Patent theorists, for example, recognize 
that races to invent dissipate rents and that the challenge of patent policy is to ensure 
that the process of rent dissipation produces as much social benefit as possible, for 
example by incentivizing early invention.95 Bitcoin’s rent dissipation uses large 
amounts of energy, imposing negative environmental externalities.96 A partial 
solution would be for miners to solve problems that require large amounts of 
memory instead of fast computation.97 One proposed variant creates problems 
                                                 
91
 It might seem that a block with more transactions would slow down hashing, but in fact the hash 
is of a fixed-size header to eliminate this incentive to drop transactions. See Weakness—Dropping 
transactions, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses#Dropping_transactions (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
92
 What is the incentive for Bitcoin miners to add transactions without fees to a block?, QUORA, 
http://www.quora.com/What-is-the-incentive-for-Bitcoin-miners-to-add-transactions-without-fees-
to-a-block (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
93
 The legal literature typically focuses on rent seeking through the political process. See, e.g., CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 70 (1990). 
But it is often defined considerably more broadly. See GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT 
FAILURE 43 (2002) (offering the following definition: “the use of resources for the purpose of 
obtaining rents for people where the rents themselves come from some activity that has some 
negative social value”); Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409 (1993) (encompassing within the definition “any distributive activity that 
takes up resources”). 
94
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining how 
rent seeking can lead to complete dissipation of rent). 
95
 See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 458-75 
(2014) (explaining that patent rents may be dissipated in more or less efficient ways). 
96
 See, e.g., Hass McCook, Under the Microscope: Economic and Environmental Costs of Bitcoin 
Mining, COIN DESK, June 21, 2014 at 11:02 BST, http://www.coindesk.com/microscope-economic-
environmental-costs-bitcoin-mining/. 
97
 See, e.g., Colin Percival, Stronger Key Derivation via Sequential Memory-Hard Functions,  
http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). This proposal is the basis for 
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whose solution would contribute to a social need, such as storage of archival 
information.98 
This strategy shares with Bitcoin’s the principle that what is rewarded is 
“proof of work,”99 differing only in the type of work to be rewarded. The argument 
that proof of work of some type is essential is that it provides a defense against 
Sybil attacks.100 Suppose that Bitcoin drastically reduced the number of new 
Bitcoins issued with each block and eliminated transaction fees. Altruism alone 
would likely be sufficient for some people to set up servers to verify transactions 
of nontrivial size.101 But malicious users might then take advantage of this by setting 
up servers to create block chains in ways that benefit them. For example, they might 
remove some number of previous blocks from the block chain and then generate 
many new blocks, creating a new longest chain that the non-malicious Bitcoin 
servers would recognize as well. This could allow the malicious users to recover 
Bitcoins they have previously spent. 
This type of manipulation is much more difficult with Bitcoin’s demanding 
proof-of-work standard, because a manipulator would need to be able to create 
blocks faster than everyone else combined. A manipulator could do this with 
ownership of more than 50% of the computing power dedicated to solving the 
hashing problem. This would allow the manipulator to execute what is known as a 
51% attack,102 producing more blocks than everyone else combined. For example, 
the manipulator could remove a block (containing a transaction in which it spent 
money) and continue hashing until it had produced at least one more block than 
                                                 
LiteCoin. See LITECOIN, https://litecoin.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
98
 See Andrew Miller et al., Permacoin: Repurposing Bitcoin Work for Data Preservation, available 
at http://cs.umd.edu/~amiller/permacoin.pdf (offering an alternative “scratch-off puzzle” for 
cryptocurrencies that is memory hard and would serve the socially beneficial function of preserving 
data). 
99
 Proof of work was originally developed as an anti-spam mechanism. See Cynthia Dwork & Moni 
Naor, Pricing via Processing, Or, Combatting Junk Mail, Advances in Cryptology". 19 
CRYPTO’92: LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 139 (1993). 
100
 A Sybil attack is an attack on a peer-to-peer system in which the attacker presents many different 
identities. See John R. Doceur, The Sybil Attack, 2429 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 251 
(2002) (discussing how such attacks can be prevented). 
101
 Many people, after all, voluntarily devote computer resources to peer-to-peer projects. See 
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 81-89 (2006). 
102
 See, e.g., Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin? (June 20, 2014, 11:42 BST), 
http://www.coindesk.com/51-attacks-real-threat-bitcoin/ (discussing the possibility of 51% attacks). 
Someone with less than 50% of the computing power has some chance of generating two blocks 
before everyone else generates one block, but the chance is not as high, and it is even less likely to 
be able to generate three blocks before everyone else generates two.  
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everyone else combined. It could then add all of these blocks at once to the block 
chain, including a spend of the money to a different account on one of the blocks, 
and legitimate Bitcoin miners would accept the new block chain as the legitimate 
block chain. Such a manipulator also might be able to selectively keep new 
transactions off the block chain, continuing to lengthen the block chain but only 
with transactions that it selects. But a 51% attack would be extraordinarily 
expensive (recently estimated at over $1 billion),103 and so it would not be worth 
the luxury of a double-spend transaction. Perhaps the greater risk is that a 
government might do this with the goal of destroying Bitcoin rather than enriching 
itself, but even this seems far-fetched.104  
Proof of work thus provides robust protection of the block chain. Arguably, 
however, it is not necessary or at least not necessary to the same degree, and a 
number of alternative cryptocurrencies either greatly reduce reliance on proof of 
work or eliminate it altogether. For example, Nxt uses a system that it calls 
“transparent forging,” in which users take turn “forging” (instead of “mining”)105 
new blocks. The order is based on a hash function and is thus quasi-random,106 but 
each user’s opportunity to hash is proportional to that user’s ownership, so Nxt’s 
system is based on the principle of “proof of stake.”107 The protocol will ignore a 
block that is mined when it is not one’s turn. Peercoin, meanwhile, does not 
explicitly use the concept of turns. 108 Any coin owner may attempt to mine a block, 
but using coins to do so uses up those coins’ “coin age.” If there are competing 
block chains, the chain with the greatest “coin age” is the authoritative one.109 In 
both systems, creating a block requires minimal computing power, and block 
creators will have incentive to include transactions with minimal transaction fees. 
                                                 
103
 See Bitcoin, COINOMETRICS, http://www.coinometrics.com/bitcoin/brix (last visited Sept. 12, 
2014).  
104
 See Kroll et al., supra note 56, at 13-14 (modeling the possibility of a “Goldfinger” attack by the 
government).  
105
 The Nxt wiki explains that the terminology is because “all possible coins already exist, and 
accounts earn coins from transaction fees alone.” See The Nxt Wikia, NXT WIKIA, 
http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).  
106
 Introduction: What is Nxt?, NXT WIKI, http://wiki.nxtcrypto.org/wiki/Nxt_Wiki (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2014).                                
107
 See The Nxt Wikia, WIKIA, http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) 
http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (“Your ability to forge Nxt depends solely on your total account 
balance as a percentage of all available coins.  This is what sets Nxt apart as a pure ‘Proof-of-Stake’ 
cryptocurrency.”). 
108
 See, e.g., Sunny King & Scott Nadal, PPCoin: Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency with Proof-of-
Stake, Aug. 19, 2012, http://peercoin.net/assets/paper/peercoin-paper.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
2014).  
109
 See Peercoin Minting, PEERCOIN, http://peercoin.net/minting (last visited Sept. 16, 2014). 
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Proof-of-stake systems present their own manipulation challenges,110 but to mount 
a 51% attack, one would need to own more than 50% of the total currency value. 
Someone in that position would have no incentive to double-spend, since any 
benefit from double-spending would be offset by a decrease in value to the currency 
as a whole. 
 Though there remains the possibility that any cryptocurrency is vulnerable 
to attacks not yet conceived, the continuing viability of proof-of-stake systems 
suggests that proof of work is not essential to a cryptocurrency. Bitcoin mining 
harms Bitcoin holders by diluting their share in Bitcoin. Issuance of new Bitcoins 
is a form of seignorage revenue for the Bitcoin institution but that revenue is 
currently spent entirely on mining. The proof-of-stake currencies show that the 
seignorage revenue could have a neutral effect on currency owners, but it is also 
possible that a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency could use its decentralized fiscal power 
for other purposes. If a cryptocurrency had some means of engaging in non-
mechanical decisionmaking about what interests to support, it could assign new 
coins to individuals who advance those purposes. Moreover, a robust 
decisionmaking mechanism could allow other peer-to-peer institutions to 
piggyback on a cryptocurrency, accepting cryptocurrency from private parties and 
then spending it. 
 The case against complete reliance on proof of work is a normative 
argument based on economic efficiency, but existing proof-of-stake systems 
confront a normative argument based on conceptions of economic equality. The 
objection is that in a pure proof-of-stake system, all coins are allocated to the initial 
creators of the system. As one online commentator objects, “This scheme is 
completely unacceptable because it’s not ‘compatible’ to decentralized nature of 
cryptocurrencies.”111 A counterargument is that the entrepreneurs and programmers 
who create and promote a currency are providing value.112 Arguably, this is better 
than a system like Bitcoin, which still gives great value to its founders (since they 
can mine coins when the hashing is easy) and then subsidizes wasteful activity. But 
some may not find this argument to be persuasive. Perhaps a system that allocates 
                                                 
110
 See Iddo Bentov, Ariel Gabizon & Alex Mizrahi, Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work, 
TECHNION, July 18, 2014, at 4, available at http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~idddo/CoA.pdf. One 
problem they identify is that if multiple parties simultaneously create a block, it becomes rational 
for the next forger to sign both blocks to reduce the danger that the forger will pick the wrong one. 
Id. at 2-3. More troublesome is the possibility that a forger might seek to bribe the party that would 
forge next or perhaps several such parties to enable a double-spend transaction. Id. at 3. Bentov et 
al., however, offer a number of solutions to these problems. Id. at 2-9. 
111
 What are Some Counter Arguments for NXT (nxtcoin) "Premine" or Initial Distribution Setup?, 
STACKEXCHANGE, http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/28366/what-are-some-counter-
arguments-for-nxt-nxtcoin-premine-or-initial-distribut/28367#28367 (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
112
 See The Nxt Wikia, WIKIA, http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
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cryptocurrency to be distributed over time to those who contribute to the project 
would satisfy both efficiency and equity concerns.  
A full assessment of these normative arguments is beyond my scope here, 
but the superficial appeal of these arguments has relevance. The Bitcoin protocol is 
able to perform the function of a decentralized fisc only because people believe that 
Bitcoin is valuable—which is because they believe that other people will believe 
that Bitcoin is valuable. This is the highest level tacit coordination game that 
already exists in Bitcoin, and it can be broken down into separate types of tacit 
coordination. For Bitcoin to maintain value, people must continue (1) to believe 
that cryptocurrencies are valuable, (2) to believe that Bitcoin in particular has value; 
and (3) to agree on just what the Bitcoin protocol is. The case for (1) is presented 
above,113 but normative arguments may also be relevant to (2). The relative appeal 
of cryptocurrencies depends on tacit coordination, which may depend in part on 
saliency, on financial features, and also on normative appeal. Meanwhile, anyone 
can produce a “hard fork” of Bitcoin, changing the protocol but accepting the 
existing block chain,114 and normative arguments would then be relevant to the 
question of which resulting block chain should be viewed as authoritative. 
Perhaps the greatest existential threat to Bitcoin is the possibility that there 
will be a tipping point that leads to some other cryptocurrency dominating it. This 
could also destabilize cryptocurrency markets more generally, for relative value 
instability makes the broader project unstable. This presents challenging design 
questions for Bitcoin developers. Arguably, they should seek to incorporate 
features of leading alternative currencies, much as the leader in a yachting race 
should tilt its sails in the same direction as the follower, to prevent even a chance 
of losing the lead.115 But one could also argue that Bitcoin should be conservative, 
reinforcing the perception of its stability and reducing the risk associated with 
experimentation. The current structure of Bitcoin decisionmaking promotes 
conservative decisionmaking. The centralized developers incorporate suggested 
                                                 
113
 See supra text accompanying notes 29-37. 
114
 David Kirk, Cryptocurrency: What is a Fork?, TECH-RECIPES, http://www.tech-
recipes.com/rx/48517/cryptocurrency-what-is-a-fork/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). A hard fork in 
the rules concerning a valid block occurs only when the new rules would result in acceptance of 
blocks that the old rules would reject. See Consensus Rule Changes, 
https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#consensus-rule-changes (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). With a 
soft fork, all new blocks continue to meet the requirements of the old rules, so the old clients will 
accept new blocks as valid additions to the block chain. Any change in the rules governing what 
constitutes the authoritative block chain will necessarily be a hard fork. 
115
 See Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from 
Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 550, 553-56 (1995) (using the yachting 
example to explain why Delaware may have incentives to imitate other states in the race for 
corporate charter revenue). 
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changes only given consensus116 in part because of concerns that lack of consensus 
would lead not only to a new competitor currency but more problematically to a 
fork of the Bitcoin block chain itself.117  
This may be the correct course. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could, 
however, be useful as a bulwark against a hard fork. The most plausible scenario in 
which a hard fork could occur is if Bitcoin miners collude to change the rules of 
Bitcoin, presumably to give themselves more Bitcoin, for example by increasing 
transaction fees118 or changing the schedule at which new Bitcoins will be 
created.119 Miners already join together in mining pools, and commentators have 
noted the possibility that this collusion could facilitate agreements to change the 
Bitcoin protocol.120 This seems especially plausible because the rate at which new 
Bitcoins are issued is planned to reduce exponentially, and there is no current plan 
for mandating minimum transaction fees.121 The miners have large fixed 
investments in computers custom-built for mining,122 and especially if individual 
                                                 
116
 The Bitcoin wiki states that when a Bitcoin improvement proposal “is contentious and cannot be 
agreed upon . . . the conservative option will always be preferred.” Bitcoin Improvement Proposals, 
BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bitcoin_Improvement_Proposals (last visited Sept. 12, 
2014). 
117
 See, e.g., How Is a Hard Fork Resolved?, STACK EXCHANGE, 
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/9986/how-is-a-hard-fork-resolved (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014) (discussing incentives the Bitcoin developers and miners have to come to a consensus 
resolution in the event of a hard fork). 
118
 There may be good reasons to increase transaction fees. See, e.g., Kerem Kaskaloglu, Near Zero 
Bitcoin Transaction Fees Cannot Last Forever, INT’L CONF. ON DIGITAL SECURITY & FORENSICS, 
June 2014, at 91, http://sdiwc.net/digital-library/near-zero-bitcoin-transaction-fees-cannot-last-
forever.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
119
 The Bitcoin wiki assumes that the supply schedule will never change. See Controlled supply, 
BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) (“The 
Bitcoin generation algorithm defines, in advance, how currency will be created and at what rate.”). 
But the algorithm can be changed with sufficient consensus.     
120
 See, e.g., Ed Felten, Bitcoin Mining Now Dominated by One Pool, FREEDOM TO TINKER (June 
16, 2014), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/bitcoin-mining-now-dominated-by-one-pool/. 
Miners might collude to change the rules even absent existing mining pools. Miners can easily 
communicate via Internet forums, and if it were clear that at some point, some miners would begin 
running a new version of the client software not approved by the core developers of Bitcoin, miners 
would need to choose sides.  
121
 Each miner has an incentive to include any transaction that includes a transaction fee sufficient 
to cover the marginal cost of processing the transaction, since there is virtually no transaction cost 
associated with a fee. See Kroll et al., supra note 56, at 12-13. A miner who ignores a transaction 
will simply be yielding its voluntary transaction fee to another miner. 
122
See How to Set Up a Bitcoin Miner, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-to-
set-up-a-miner/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).                
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enterprises faced bankruptcy as a result of decreased revenue,123  they might have 
an incentive to accept the risks associated with a hard fork. In principle, Bitcoin 
could survive with a hard fork, and Bitcoins that existed on one block chain but not 
the other would have a value based on the relative perceived legitimacy of the block 
chains. But this would add complexity, as Bitcoin payment processors would need 
to offer different prices for block chain A, block chain B, and block chain A & B 
Bitcoins, and further forks would complicate things further. 
A peer-to-peer decisionmaking mechanism could reduce the risk of a 
successful hard fork in two ways. First, if such a mechanism were established and 
were used to make normative decisions about the evolution of Bitcoin, the resulting 
decisions might have greater perceived legitimacy. Miners colluding to execute a 
hard fork of Bitcoin would recognize that the success of their project would depend 
on the outcome of the tacit coordination game in which people assess the relative 
authoritativeness of the two forks, and this might depend on normative 
considerations.  One argument they might make currently is that a centralized group 
of Bitcoin developers rather than the broader Bitcoin community makes decisions 
about changes to the software and that this is less legitimate than decisions made 
by the mining community. A peer-to-peer decisionmaking mechanism could help 
neutralize that argument. Second, peer-to-peer decisionmaking could allow more 
rapid evolution of Bitcoin. To avoid the perception that Bitcoin is an oligarchy, the 
centralized developers make changes only when they perceive strong consensus in 
favor of the changes. But high supermajority requirements can block useful 
improvements,124 including decisions necessary either to appease miners or to 
protect against their assumption of greater power. 
II. PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Bitcoin, Part I showed, offers an ingenious scheme for maintaining a 
consistent ledger without using a central server. The protocol uses a simple 
coordination rule to decide which of multiple block chains required the most work 
to create and therefore is authoritative. It incentivizes third parties to perform the 
artificial tasks that make up this work by promising them new Bitcoins and 
                                                 
123
 In general, the prospect of bankruptcy can lead to risky business decisions, since it is preferable 
for the existing owners for the business to have a small chance of survival than to have the business 
taken over by creditors. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 439, 461-63 (1992) (discussing the incentives for equity holders to take risks on the eve of 
bankruptcy). 
124
 Scholars have suggested that supermajority rules may sometimes be useful. See John O. 
McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rules, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 67 (2008) (describing situations in which supermajority requirements may be efficient). But 
extreme versions of supermajority rules, such as unanimity requirements, will block changes that 
even the vast majority of observers believe are beneficial. 
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transaction fees. Because simple examination of the block chain makes it possible 
to determine how much work was performed to create it, this coordination 
arrangement makes falsification of the block chain virtually impossible. Other 
cryptocurrencies rely on other simple coordination rules to determine the true block 
chain. None of the cryptocurrencies requires any human judgment. Mechanical 
rules reduce the chance that disagreement about which block chain is correct could 
lead to a hard fork of the currency, with some users owning Bitcoins valid on one 
block chain but not the other. 
The need for human judgment, however, cannot be avoided when the 
questions at issue become more complex. Part III will address issues that would 
arise in using peer-to-peer governance beyond cryptocurrencies, for tasks such as 
determining whether to authorize a payment to be made from an insurance fund. 
The purpose of this Part is to argue that even for an institution with goals as simple 
as those of a cryptocurrency—essentially, maintaining a reliable ledger of 
transactions—incorporating human judgment may strengthen the institution rather 
than harm it. The success of Bitcoin unavoidably depends on tacit coordination 
around which version of the protocol should count as authoritative. Creating a 
formal coordination game with Bitcoin payments could focus the results of the 
informal tacit coordination game, thus stabilizing Bitcoin and reducing the 
possibility that Bitcoin will be administered for the benefit of particular groups 
(such as miners) rather than for the benefit of users as a whole. 
Part II.A will begin the task of illustrating how a cryptocurrency could make 
decisions peer-to-peer with a simple decision currently conducted centrally: 
approval of a proposed checkpoint. This can be analogized to an administrative 
adjudication resolving a yes-or-no issue. Individual binary decisions can be 
aggregated into more complex decisions, including how to improve a text or code, 
and Part II.B will thus explore how Bitcoin could make peer-to-peer decisions about 
how to evolve the Bitcoin protocol itself. Because the protocol is expressed as code, 
this is a general decisionmaking task analogous to rulemaking.125 Then, Part II.C 
will show how a cryptocurrency could be designed to award new coins to those 
who promote the currency, thus requiring decisions about how much money should 
be given to various parties. This demonstrates how to create a discretionary 
decentralized fisc. In combination, these capabilities cover the essential building 
blocks of any decisionmaking system.  
A. Checkpointing 
Checkpointing is a useful starting point because it constitutes a centralized 
element to the peer-to-peer system. Moreover, it can be thought of as a simple 
                                                 
125
 See Protocol Rules, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_rules (last visited Sept. 12, 
2014) (discussing rules enforced by the protocol code).12, 2014). 
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binary decision—someone proposes the addition of a checkpoint, and a decision 
must be made whether it should be created—and a binary decision such as a vote 
is a fundamental building block in any system of decisionmaking. A checkpoint is 
a hash of a block that is in the block chain.126 Software honoring a checkpoint will 
reject a proposed block chain that does not contain the checkpoint hash, without 
need even to calculate the total effort in producing the presented block chain.127 
Once a Bitcoin mining client accepts a checkpoint, it will reject even a hypothetical 
longer block chain, thus reducing the damage that could be accomplished with a 
hypothetical 51% attack.128 Currently, checkpoints are included sometimes when 
the Bitcoin reference code is updated for other reasons.129 This means that Bitcoin 
includes few checkpoints,130 but some other cryptocurrencies include a much larger 
number of centralized checkpoints.131 
Before describing how a tacit coordination game can produce checkpoints, 
it may be useful to consider other decentralized options. This highlights that peer-
to-peer governance producing normative decisions is possible even if one cannot 
rely on a system of tacit coordination or if one prefers not to do so. The main 
purpose of this Article is to defend the proposition that peer-to-peer governance is 
possible. The subsidiary purpose is to argue that peer-to-peer governance should be 
based on tacit coordination games because of the weaknesses in other approaches. 
Thus, in Part II.A.1, we will consider peer-to-peer governance through voting, vote 
buying, and jury-like mechanisms. Part II.A.2 will an explicit tacit coordination 
game can decide on checkpoints. The purpose of both sections is to highlight how 
peer-to-peer governance may be used in general. Checkpointing is selected as an 
example not for its importance, but for its simplicity. 
                                                 
126
 David Gilson, Feathercoin Secures Its Block Chain with Advanced Checkpointing, COINDESK 
(Aug. 28, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/feathercoin-secures-block-chain-advanced-
check-pointing/ (describing checkpointing and a new cryptocurrency that includes a centralized 
checkpointing feed). 
127
 This does not take long, but if this process takes even a second or two, it may facilitate denial-
of-service attacks on Bitcoin miners. See supra note 80. 
128
 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. A 51% attacker would not be able to remove blocks 
past the checkpoint. 
129
 Gilson, supra note 126. 
130
 See Checkpoints, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/checkpoints.cpp 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (listing only 13 checkpoints as of Sept. 18, 2014). 
131
 Sunny King & Scott Nadal, PPCoin: Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency with Proof-of-Stake 4 (Aug. 
19, 2012), available at http://wallet.peercoin.net/assets/paper/peercoin-paper.pdf (proposing to 
include several checkpoints per day in a new cryptocurrency). 
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1. Resolution Without Tacit Coordination 
The most obvious mechanism for accomplishing peer-to-peer governance 
is voting. For example, if someone proposes a new checkpoint, we could allow 
anyone to vote on the new checkpoint and count up all the votes. But the general 
principle of one-person, one-vote132 will not work with peer-to-peer governance 
based on Bitcoin. In theory, a peer-to-peer governance system might maintain a list 
of people (or just people authorized to vote) and provide some mechanism for them 
to authenticate themselves.133 But Bitcoin does not do that, and it is not possible to 
know whether hundreds of different Bitcoin addresses correspond in fact to the 
same person. Thus, in the absence of reliance on some external non-peer-to-peer 
people-tracking mechanism, Bitcoin cannot allow voting based on one-person, one-
vote, even if that were desirable. 
As a result, the most obvious mechanism for implementing voting is to 
allow voting proportionate with ownership interests. This is, of course, the general 
system for voting in corporate law.134 At least one cryptocurrency, NXT, allows for 
voting on certain types of issues based on ownership interest.135 Presumably, voters 
will share an interest in a cryptocurrency’s success, and voting by interest may work 
for other types of peer-to-peer institutions as well. But voting in proportion to 
interest has two problems, both familiar from corporate law. First is the problem of 
oppression, that those with a majority of interests may make decisions to benefit 
themselves at the minority’s expense.136 Second is the problem of apathy. Many 
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 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing importance of this principle in U.S. 
government). Other forms of peer governance do not involve voting, but emphasize different 
versions of equality. See Peer Governance, P2P FOUNDATION, 
http://p2pfoundation.net/Peer_Governance (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing “equipotentiality” 
first among peer-to-peer governance’s “main characteristics,” and explaining “that in a peer project 
all the participants have an equal ability to contribute, although that not all the participants have the 
same skills and abilities”). 
133
 Some have argued that a mechanism like the block chain might be used to produce a more reliable 
mechanism for counting votes in democratic elections, though a critical first step would be to 
distribute to each authorized voter the ability to vote exactly once. See VoteCoin, START JOIN, 
https://www.startjoin.com/VoteCoin (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (discussing the idea for block 
chain-based voting).  
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 See Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty over Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485, 496-97 (1991) 
(describing the development of the principle of “one share, one vote” in Delaware). 
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 NXT Voting System, NXT.ORG, http://nxt.org/nxt-features/nxt-voting-system (last visited Sept. 
13, 2014).   
136
 This is particularly a concern in close corporations, where shareholders’ interests are more likely 
to vary than in public corporations. See generally Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies 
in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 
371, 376-402 (2003) (reviewing states’ approaches to oppression). 
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voters may not take time to fully study the issues, leading to uninformed voting,137 
and many voters may choose not to vote, leading to voting that is not broadly 
representative of the population. These are of course also familiar problems in both 
republican government138 and direct democracy.139 
These problems may not be large in the context of checkpointing, because 
relatively little is at stake, but there are dangers. Suppose, for example, that a 
sufficiently large coalition of miners seeks to exclude other miners. For example, 
established miners might try to block new entrants into the mining market. They 
might accomplish this with checkpoints, validating versions of the block chain with 
only their own recent blocks and thus implicitly rejecting the blocks of new 
entrants. Of course, such a coalition might simply change the rules of Bitcoin and 
add their own checkpoints, but it may be easier to exploit collusion by adding 
checkpoints within the protocol rules. If the rules allowed for peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking about checkpointing, then even new entrants following these rules 
would be forced to accept the superiority of the establishment block chain. The 
establishment miners do not own all Bitcoins, but they are a large interest group 
who would vote. It may be irrational for most other Bitcoin owners to take the time 
to learn about checkpointing issues and vote their own shares, and so the self-
interested miners—even if they were just a small minority of Bitcoin owners—
might be able to make decisions to benefit their own interests. 
A vote buying mechanism faces even greater problems along these lines.140 
A vote buying scheme is effectively an auction, and the outcome that receives the 
most financial support is chosen as policy. Bitcoin owners could send Bitcoins to 
one address to register support for a checkpoint and a different address to register 
opposition. These would be public keys created without corresponding private 
keys, so sending the Bitcoins would destroy them. Holders of small stakes will have 
little incentive to try to buy their preferred outcomes. This would be true even if 
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 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 396, 
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IGNORANCE (2013) (arguing that voter ignorance justifies small government); Philip K. Hastings, 
The Voter and the Non-Voter, 62 AM. J. SOC. 302 (1956) (discussing selection bias effects resulting 
from nonvoting). 
139
 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence 
Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003) (discussing how 
referenda could be improved by providing better information to voters). 
140
 For an analysis of vote-buying in corporate law, see Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry 
into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533 (1990). 
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there were a policy providing for refund of the Bitcoins spent by the losing side or 
the winning side; as long as there is any probability one will lose one’s Bitcoins, 
the optimal individual strategy is to free-ride. Moreover, small holders of Bitcoins 
would have little incentive to become informed in the first place. 
 Vote buying has long been viewed as undemocratic,141 but recent research 
has suggested that a variation on vote buying could work in the corporate context. 
E. Glen Weyl describes quadratic vote buying, in which the cost of votes purchased 
is a quadratic function of the number of votes.142 For example, someone buying two 
votes would pay four times as much as someone buying one vote. The cost of a 
marginal vote is thus linear in the amount of votes purchased,143 thus 
counterbalancing the increasing marginal benefit of votes.  Weyl and Eric Posner 
argue that this could be especially useful for corporate law, addressing the concern 
that existing shareholder voting relies on shareholders who may not have sufficient 
information to vote.144 An approximation they call square-root voting would simply 
allow shareholders to vote the square root of the number of shares they own.145  
Weyl recognizes, however, the danger of “de-merging,” in which a single 
individual pretends to be multiple individuals.146 While he argues that quadratic 
voting reduces the danger of this, he also shows that the relative inefficiency caused 
by de-merging will be on the order of the number of separate identities created by 
a de-merge.147 With Bitcoin, it would be trivially cheap for a Bitcoin owner to 
separate its interests into any arbitrary number of interests, perhaps using a 
“mixing” service to make it impossible to prove a common origin.148 This defeats 
quadratic voting. The scheme could be used with Bitcoin only if voting were 
restricted to verified identified individual owners of Bitcoins. Perhaps a peer-to-
                                                 
141
 See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1348 (2000).  
142
 E. Glen Wyle, Quadratic Vote Buying, (Apr. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2003531. 
143
 Id. at 1.  
144
 See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=226245 [hereinafter Posner & Weyl, Efficient Corporate Governance]; see 
also Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2343956 (arguing that quadratic voting also could be useful for 
democratic institutions).  
145
 Posner & Weyl, Efficient Corporate Governance, supra note 144, at 11-12. 
146
 Weyl, supra note 142, at 21-22. 
147
 Id. at 21. 
148
 Xavier Boyen, et al, Bitter to Better - How to Make Bitcoin a Better Currency, in FINANCIAL 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 399, 403 (Angelos D. Keromytis ed., 2012) (discussing the 
use of mixers by Bitcoin users to provide anonymity). 
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peer system for such verification could be developed, but at least for now, it does 
not seem a viable mechanism for achieving peer-to-peer governance. 
 The jury system ensures that some decisions are made by individuals who 
are forced to scrutinize the evidence with some care. Could we adapt the 
mechanism to Bitcoin, designating a random sample of Bitcoin owners to make 
decisions, such as whether to approve a checkpoint? Certainly, it would be possible 
to select random Bitcoin owners, with the probability of being selected proportional 
to their interests. One might even imagine a system for punishing selected users 
who refused to cast a vote.149 But forcing them to engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking is likely to be much more difficult. We could require evidence of 
reasoned decisionmaking, such as a written opinion.150 But there are two problems 
with this. First, some Bitcoin owners might offer to create such evidence for others, 
but that again would shift power to those with greater stakes in decisions. Perhaps 
we could police such activity, but that would require normative judgment. Second, 
assessing whether someone has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking requires 
normative judgment too. Thus, the problem is recursive. Insisting on reasoned 
decisionmaking requires more reasoned decisionmaking. 
 All this does not mean that it would be impossible to build peer-to-peer 
governance on a voting mechanism or on a random selection jury-like mechanism. 
The problems that we have identified exist in our own familiar democratic and 
corporate institutions, yet they endure. The adaptations are complex. In 
corporations, for example, voters elect board members and entrust those board 
members to make decisions,151 and of course voting for representation is the critical 
feature of republican government. Perhaps similar adaptations could be imagined 
for Bitcoin, with identifiable Bitcoin owners electing representatives who have the 
limited role of supervising voting by anonymous Bitcoin owners. There may, 
however, be an alternative, a decisionmaking process that is peer-to-peer to the 
core. All peer-to-peer mechanisms, including Bitcoin, file-sharing,152 and other 
                                                 
149
 Cf. Note, The Case for Compulsory Voting in the United States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591, 600 
(2007) (discussing the case for compulsory jury service).  
150
 The norm of written opinions for judicial decisionmaking can be justified in part on the ground 
that it forces judges to be careful in their reasoning.  See generally Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical 
Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 294 (2008) (discussing the assumption that 
judges deliberate each issue carefully).  
151
 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Directory Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (highlighting the importance of the Board of Directors 
in corporate governance).  
152
 The file-sharing example highlights that cooperation may exist not merely as a result of rational 
self-interested calculation, but also as a result of social norms. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (discussing the role of social norms in file-sharing 
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projects,153 are built to achieve cooperation even in the face of hostile adversaries 
who would destroy the system or manipulate it to their own benefit. Group 
decisionmaking can be seen as just another such problem, and the peer-to-peer 
challenge is to create a coordination rule that produces clear and generally 
justifiable decisions in such conditions. 
2. Resolution with Tacit Coordination 
How would a peer-to-peer checkpointing system work? The goal of this 
Article is not to describe the full range of peer-to-peer normative decisionmaking 
systems or even to identify the best, but rather to illustrate proof of concept. As a 
result, we will begin with a simple peer-to-peer mechanism for constructing a tacit 
coordination game to make a binary decision. 
Someone could support a new checkpoint by paying a proposal fee to a pre-
established address not under any individual’s control and including in the 
transaction metadata a reference to the hash representing the block that would serve 
as the checkpoint being proposed. Once the proposal transaction were added to the 
block chain, all could recognize the normative decisionmaking process’s initiation. 
Individuals would then have a fixed period of time within which to dedicate 
Bitcoins to supporting or opposing the checkpoint. One would demonstrate support 
or opposition by transferring Bitcoins to designated addresses, such as public keys 
generated from hashes of the proposal transaction followed by strings such as “Yes” 
and “No”. The chance that anyone would own these addresses is infinitesimally 
low, because the system for generating keys prevents anyone from purposefully 
generating a private key corresponding to any particular public key.  
The purpose of all these transactions is simply to create a convention for 
announcing support or opposition to a particular proposal, and the proposal fee 
would count as an initial announcement of support for the proposal. The fixed 
period could be measured in number of blocks to be added to the block chain from 
the time of the initial proposal, but if there is a sufficient amount of activity at the 
end, the time period would be automatically extended.154 The winning position 
would be the position with the most support, and the money dedicated by the losers 
would be allocated to those supporting the winning position. Earlier supporters 
would receive money before later ones, so there would be no incentive to add 
                                                 
communities). 
153
 See Moshe Babaioff et al., Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems, in ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY 
593, 593-94 (Noam Nisan et al. ed., 2007).  
154
 The extension criterion could be that the resolution will be extended (perhaps for two more 
blocks) if either of the most recent two blocks would change the outcome. Thus, an attempt to 
engineer a surprise very large allocation at the last minute would fail to surprise, and others would 
then have an opportunity to make opposing allocations. 
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money to the winning side at the last minute. This reallocation would be 
accomplished by the generation of new Bitcoins for the winners. 
For example, suppose that a proposal is made to add a checkpoint based on 
block X. The proposal is initiated by A, who is required to pay a proposal fee of at 
least (let us suppose) 1 Bitcoin and meets that minimum obligation. Suppose that B 
places 2 Bitcoins against the proposal and then C places 1 Bitcoin against the 
proposal. (We will count B’s transaction as occurring first if it is listed earlier in the 
block chain.) If there are no other transactions, then the proposal fails, 3 to 1. This 
would entitle B to a generation transaction of 3 Bitcoins altogether (including the 2 
Bitcoins to be refunded) and C to a generation transaction of 1 Bitcoin. Because all 
the original Bitcoins that were voted are effectively destroyed, the total number of 
spendable Bitcoins in existence remains constant. Of course, if D had buttressed 
A’s position by spending another 10 Bitcoins, and no other transactions occurred, 
then the checkpoint would be approved. A would receive 2 Bitcoins (equal to its 
investment plus 1 of B’s Bitcoins) and D would receive 12 Bitcoins (its investment 
plus 1 of B’s and 1 of C’s). It does not matter whether D and A are in reality accounts 
owned by the same person. If another party E also supported A’s position, then E 
would simply have the funds invested refunded, without receiving anyone else’s 
Bitcoins. 
This game is a tacit coordination game in which potential participants must 
anticipate whether more funds will be distributed in favor of one position than in 
favor of another. After A devotes its 1 Bitcoin in favor of the checkpoint, B must 
consider whether to match A’s Bitcoin. If B matches, B will want to at least 
marginally exceed the amount offered by A so that B will win if there are no further 
transactions. B will have an incentive to match and at least marginally exceed A if 
B believes that no one else will participate or that if there is participation, more 
participants eventually will place money against the proposal than in its favor.  
Of course, A will have an incentive to fight back to win its initial bet against 
B. One side or another might exceed the other’s contribution by a sizable amount 
as a way of signaling its fortitude. Taking a large position, however, has two effects. 
On one hand, it does show the resoluteness of the party putting that amount of 
money in support of a position, perhaps implying that the party is willing to put 
even more money down in favor of the same position. But it also increases the 
chance that third parties will be drawn into the game. There is at least some fixed 
cost associated with initial entry into the game, including consideration of the issue 
to be resolved, but a contribution that exceeds the prior one functions as an offer to 
enter into a bet, and it will be worth taking the time to consider this if the offer is 
large. The ultimate question that a party supporting a position must ask is what third 
parties would decide to do if they ultimately focused on it. 
The game is thus a tacit coordination game, in which any participant must 
anticipate what hypothetical other participants might choose to do in the future, 
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recognizing that those hypothetical other participants would be looking 
prospectively at still other hypothetical participants. The dynamics of this particular 
tacit coordination game are similar to those of an all-pay auction,155 in which 
existing investments are not sunk, and so participants have incentives to bolster 
these investments. But rational participants in such an auction will recognize that 
others will have the same incentives and risk aversion will counsel against throwing 
good money after bad.  
Everyone’s incentive is to do what people in the future will do, with no 
authoritative answer disciplining the participants. And so the incentive is to look 
for focal points that serve as tacit coordination devices, and the ultimate question—
whether a particular checkpoint should be added to the block chain—serves as a 
natural focal principle. Collusion is difficult, because even if existing participants 
collude, someone could try to combat the collusion and create interest that would 
draw more third parties, drawn from the essentially unlimited pool of Bitcoin 
owners, into the game. The initial participants are likely to have relatively high 
knowledge because of the need to anticipate others’ decisions, but later participants 
might be initially low knowledge and conduct research to gain knowledge, drawn 
by the high stakes.  
Of course, it is possible that there could be alternative focal points, but there 
will be so many of them that they will tend to cancel out.156 For example, one could 
argue that the original proposal is focal, or the first position that someone takes is 
focal, or the most recent position that someone takes is focal, but it is hard to see 
why any of these differentiates itself from any other. Similarly, one could look to 
see who is making the most noise in favor of a particular position, but if that could 
change a focal point, then everyone would scream. 
This argument is admittedly somewhat informal, and it may seem 
inconsistent with game theory. As Hykel Hosni points out in an analysis of 
coordination games,157 coordination games generally involve multiple Nash 
equilibria.158 If one expected others to follow a particular focal point, one should 
follow that as well, so the Nash equilibrium concept does not predict a particular 
focal point. However, when there are multiple Nash equilibria, coordination will 
often be around the solution that produces the highest payoffs to the players.159 The 
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 An all-pay auction is one in which the losers pay the amount of their bids. See, e.g., Michael R. 
Baye et al., The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information, 8 ECON. THEORY 291 (1996) 
(providing an economic model). 
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 See Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 548-56. 
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 See Hykel Hosni, Interpretation, Coordination and Conformity, in GAMES: UNIFYING LOGIC, 
LANGUAGE, AND PHILOSOPHY 37 (Ondrej Majer eds., 2009).  
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 Id. at 46-47. 
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 See id. at 47 (discussing a version of the Battle of the Sexes game in which both members of a 
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question of whether to use normative focal points in general is a tacit coordination 
problem that will apply across many checkpoint disputes, and those who participate 
in these disputes will likely be better off if the system works than if it fails. Hosni, 
moreover, argues that in coordination games “agents should apply Reasons to 
discard those possible strategies that will prevent them from conforming on their 
mutual expectations,”160 for example because multiple strategies that point in 
different directions are indistinguishable, and “a perfect reason will be a choice 
function which always returns a singleton, a unique strategy.”161 The normative 
argument for using normative focal points is, in this framework, a reason that 
returns a single strategy, using normative focal points.  
What does it mean, though, for the normative question—in this case, 
whether a checkpoint should be added—to serve as a focal point? Perhaps a more 
precise statement of the principle would be that the focal point is the best answer to 
the question. The Bitcoin software code itself includes a comment indicating that 
“a good checkpoint block”162 should be “surrounded by blocks with reasonable 
timestamps”163 and “[c]ontains no strange transactions.”164 The existing checkpoints 
seem to have round block numbers,165 perhaps to emphasize that the checkpoint is 
arbitrary rather than designed to achieve some advantage. A checkpoint should be 
sufficiently recent that it is useful, but sufficiently old that the probability of its 
being dropped from the block chain would be extremely small, so that the 
checkpoint functions solely to speed up and solidify block chain analysis rather 
than to change the outcome. One could, of course, debate the relative importance 
of all of these considerations or perhaps even whether some of these considerations 
                                                 
couple who must make independent decisions without communication prefer attending a Bach 
concert to a Stravinsky concert, but the Stravinsky concert is also a Nash equilibrium because if one 
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Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Palmar Thorsteinsson, Tacit Coordination and Equilibrium Selection in a 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883465  (July 11, 2011) (demonstrating tacit coordination on the highest 
payoff option in a laboratory experiment). 
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 Id.   
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 Bitcoin/Checkpoints, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/checkpoints.cpp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
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 Id. Sometimes, a Bitcoin block will have a timestamp before a block that is nominally earlier in 
the block chain. See What is the Standard Deviation of Block Generation Times?, Bitcoinbeta, 
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/4690/what-is-the-standard-deviation-of-block-
generation-times (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining that timestamps may not be accurate and 
that the difference between blocks may be even negative). The Bitcoin software does not seek to 
provide a peer-to-peer mechanism for ensuring that timestamps are accurate. 
164
 See Bitcoin/Checkpoints, supra note 162. 
165
 See id. (including blocks such as 168,000 and 295,000 as checkpoints). 
  PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE     37 
 
 
   
 
matter at all. Participants in the peer-to-peer checkpoint process may well engage 
in some form of online debate. But someone considering all of these factors will 
likely come to some conclusion about how strong the case is for a new checkpoint. 
Different people may come to different conclusions, and they may change their 
views once other people credibly signal their own views. But it is this familiar 
process of trying to figure out the best answer to a problem that seems likely to 
constitute the search for the focal point. 
Does this focal point decisionmaking mechanism share the flaws of other 
peer-to-peer mechanisms? Superficially, it might appear to be quite similar to the 
vote buying mechanism. That approach and the focal point approach both 
ultimately resolve a question based on which of two positions attracts a larger 
number of Bitcoins. But the incentives are critically different, because with the 
focal point mechanism, those who supported the winning side receive the 
contributions in support of the losing side. We must still address, however, whether 
apathy might lead to poor decisionmaking and whether the process is likely to be 
biased in favor of concentrated interests. The financial incentive to be on the 
winning side is central to addressing both questions. This addresses the concern 
about apathy. The mechanism requires only a few individuals to participate, and it 
gives those individuals incentives to inform themselves sufficiently to enable 
predictions of what the final resolution might be. The larger the amount at stake, 
the greater the incentives to acquire information and generate arguments will be. 
The danger that some Bitcoin owners’ interests might be given a high 
degree of weight, however, is more serious. An initial concern might be that anyone 
with self-interest would be able to bias the process, even if that owner has only a 
small number of Bitcoins relative to the broader community of potential 
decisionmaking participants. There is some danger of this, because it will be 
rational for participants to change their assessment of the focal point given signals 
from others. An investment in a particular position might reflect a genuine view of 
the focal point or an attempt at manipulation, but the former possibility will receive 
at least some weight. The more common attempts at manipulation are, however, the 
less weight they are likely to receive in focal point analysis. Moreover, such 
attempts will generally encourage others to participate in the process, because 
making an investment inconsistent with the focal point provides a financial 
opportunity for those on the opposite side.  
Overall, the effect is similar to that of “noise traders” in the stock market, 
who make their decisions for reasons other than market fundamentals. These noise 
traders can influence prices, but they also attract more participation from 
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sophisticated parties.166 This can make stock prices more precise overall,167 though 
less precise in cases in which there is more self-interested participation than 
expected. Whether self-interested participation on net improves accuracy or 
decreases it is an empirical question, though empirical evidence from analogous 
contexts is encouraging.168 Even isolated effects of self-interested advocacy in 
individual cases may be troubling, but self-interest affects many types of 
decisionmaking with which we are familiar, including lobbying in the legislative 
arena and hiring local counsel who knows the judge in the judicial one. The 
mechanism described here at least gives third parties incentives to try to identify 
manipulation and challenge it. 
A concern of potentially greater magnitude is that the existence of self-
interest may change the focal point. This seems unlikely when the self-interest is 
contained to individuals with a relatively small number of Bitcoins, but the problem 
is more severe if the self-interest affects a large proportion of the Bitcoin 
community and especially of the community that participates in adjudicative 
decisionmaking. If participants in the tacit coordination game expect that there is a 
high probability that the later participants will be Bitcoin miners, for example, they 
might try to identify the normative focal point from the perspective of the Bitcoin 
miners. This provides a strong argument for including individuals other than 
Bitcoin miners in the normative decisionmaking process.169  
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 See, e.g., JOHN L. TEALL, FINANCIAL TRADING AND INVESTING 118 (2013) (discussing how 
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analysis, but a miner who happens to solve a hash puzzle may not be informed about a more 
complicated normative problem. 
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It seems unlikely, however, that the interests of Bitcoin miners will receive 
disproportionate weight in any normative analysis. Each participant will have more 
at stake from the money being placed at risk than from collateral consequences, so 
even if someone would like to collude with other Bitcoin miners, a participant will 
have an incentive to defect if the ultimate focal point is expected to be some 
distance from what the miners would prefer. The focal point is not likely to depend 
much on who participates in the tacit coordination game, because there is a strong 
normative argument for considering the welfare of the entire Bitcoin community. 
Even if it did depend on the identity of the participants, there will be at least some 
participants who are not Bitcoin miners, and indeed there is little reason to think 
that those who mine will be especially likely to participate in decisionmaking. And 
even if most active participants are miners (and this seems unlikely), in the pool of 
potential participants, the proportion of Bitcoin miners seeking to obtain some 
collateral advantage will be small. In short, it seems doubtful that the interests of 
large concentrated groups like miners will receive greater weight than the interests 
of the broader public. Perhaps they might receive slightly more weight. But large 
concentrated groups receive much more weight in democratic processes,170 so at 
least this seems likely to be an improvement. 
We cannot predict the result of tacit coordination games based on theory 
alone. There are multiple equilibria in any tacit coordination game, so game theory 
alone cannot determine which equilibrium will result.171 We have seen, though, that 
Bitcoin’s success already is dependent on multiple forms of tacit coordination, and 
this is true for other institutions. The “ultimate rule of recognition”172 that results in 
the acceptance of legitimacy of governments can be viewed as the outcome of a 
tacit coordination game. If that game produced a general perception tomorrow that 
Bozo the Cloud is dictator, then the Era of Bozo would begin. We do not worry 
about that in the United States because the tacit understanding making the 
government legitimate is strongly entrenched. History teaches that tacit 
coordination can produce great stability, but does not always do so. 
Peer-to-peer governance could be introduced gradually, allowing for 
testing. The decisionmaking apparatus initially might serve as a tool for 
recommending decisions to the Bitcoin software repository administrators. 
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Initially, they might ignore it altogether, choosing their own checkpoints instead. 
But if it produced reasonable recommendations, they might establish a weak 
presumption in favor of following the checkpoint recommendations of the peer-to-
peer decisionmaking system, and perhaps later a strong presumption and then the 
exclusive mechanism by which they decide whether to add checkpoints. 
Eventually, the client software might be modified so that it automatically 
incorporated a checkpoint whenever the analysis of the block chain revealed a 
completed decisionmaking process recommending one. If this proved problematic, 
the administrators could remove this feature from the client software. But gradually 
increased reliance on peer-to-peer decisionmaking will build legitimacy over 
time.173 
B. Evolution of the Reference Code 
Checkpoints are a relatively trivial aspect of Bitcoin operations. Currently, 
a checkpoint is added only as part of a regular client software update. Some 
competing cryptocurrencies checkpoint much more often, but this may be because 
they think this is a necessary security precaution in the absence of a proof-of-work 
system.174 So, decentralizing checkpointing would make only an incremental 
difference in the degree to which Bitcoin decisionmaking is peer-to-peer. A more 
fundamental innovation would be to use peer-to-peer decisionmaking to resolve 
whether to change the client software in the official repository. Fully implemented, 
this innovation would allow decisions recorded on the block chain to determine 
whether changes should be made to the source code. In principle, this could be used 
for any open-source project, and it could be used to generate or amend documents 
of any kind, including public or private rules and regulations. 
Open-source projects are generally managed with the assistance of 
versioning software (the current most popular versioning protocol is git175), which 
amounts to a more powerful version of the “track changes” feature in popular word 
processors. This software allows users to make a version of the software code, 
change it, and then propose that it be integrated into the official version. For 
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 See Emanuela Carbonara et al., Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
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that git overtook subversion in popularity around 2009). 
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example, a recent proposed change to Bitcoin involved adding a feature enabling 
the host of the software to limit the total bandwidth it uses.176 The user who 
proposed this had created a remote fork of the master branch of the project, copying 
all of the code files to a repository under that user’s control. After making changes, 
the user later filed a “pull request”177 for the remote fork to be merged into the 
master branch, which would involve changes to 14 different files. Ordinarily, a user 
filing a pull request will have incorporated changes made in the master branch since 
the original creation of the remote fork.178 The centralized software developer or 
developers can choose whether to accept a pull request. Periodically, the centralized 
developer will create a new branch within the repository designating a new version 
of the open source software by forking from the master branch. This new branch 
may thus include several sets of new features and other changes, such as 
documentation improvements and bug fixes. Anyone can then compile the 
software, and some websites (such as the Bitcoin Foundation’s website,179 in the 
case of Bitcoin) host the compiled versions, including installers for multiple 
operating systems.  
The critical determinations necessary to control the development of a 
software repository are whether to accept a proposal to pull changes from a remote 
fork into the master fork and whether to create a new version branch of the software 
based on the current master branch. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking ideally also would 
control whether to create experimental branches and whether to approve pulling 
changes into these branches. This would enable peer-to-peer decisionmaking about 
the development of features, rather than only about whether some final proposed 
version of a feature should be accepted in the master branch. For any particular 
decision, the process could work exactly like the normative decisionmaking process 
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 Jmcorgan, Comment to Adds Publishing Blocks and Transactions over  ZMQ, GITHUB (July 27, 
2014, 5:05 PM), https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/4594. (offering a set of changes that purport 
to facilitate broadcasting of information on newly generated blocks and new transactions among 
Bitcoin nodes). 
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 A pull request is a request for software changes to be incorporated in the master branch. The 
software hosting the repository creates discussion forums built around each pull request. See 
Jmcorgan, supra. This allows users to discuss the changes. The user who creates the pull request 
can then make further changes in response to feedback. 
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 A significant function of versioning software is to facilitate integration of different sets of 
changes, which may conflict with one another. See, e.g., Resolving Conflicts, GIT HOW TO, 
http://githowto.com/resolving_conflicts  (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (explaining how to resolve 
conflicts in git). 
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 Overview, BITCOIN FOUNDATION, https://bitcoinfoundation.org/about/overview/ (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2014) (discussing downloadable software content for members).   
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for determining whether to accept a proposed checkpoint described above.180 A user 
would pay a proposal fee by making a Bitcoin (or other cryptocurrency) payment, 
using metadata to indicate in some concise way the nature of the proposal.181 
Owners of Bitcoins (or other cryptocurrency) could then send money in support of 
or in opposition to a proposal, and eventually the losing side’s contribution would 
be distributed to the winning side.  
Those who have control over a repository could observe when decisions 
were final and update the repository accordingly. Of course, they might choose to 
disregard changes, but anyone else could create a version of the repository 
including the relevant changes. Peer-to-peer decision proposals could specify the 
hash of the repository that would exist if those proposals were implemented, and 
those downloading repository code could confirm a hash match. So, if a norm of 
peer-to-peer decisionmaking were clearly established, there might be many 
repositories that were mirrors of one another, and operators of client software 
simply would reject the repositories that were not up-to-date. A peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking process removes the need for any one software repository to be 
designated or even thought of as the official one. We have seen that the Bitcoin 
protocol establishes a mechanism for determining which of competing block chains 
should be accepted as the correct one, and the peer-to-peer decisionmaking protocol 
would ensure that the authoritative block chain can determine which of competing 
software repositories should be considered to be authoritative.  
With these decisionmaking elements in place, the peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking process would resemble legislative processes for proposing 
legislation, offering amendments, and amending amendments. In contrast to the 
process followed in Robert’s Rules of Order,182 however, more than one set of 
issues can be debated at any particular time.183 Of course, the normative evaluation 
of whether to approve a proposal to merge a set of changes into a master branch 
involves in part an assessment of whether this is the appropriate time to do so. It 
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 See supra Part II.A.2. 
181
  For example, the user might report a hash of the proposed changes. Others could then search the 
Internet using services such as Google or file-sharing services to find the file with the reported hash. 
Presumably, users would reject a proposal with a hash that could not be identified. It would also be 
possible to place full proposals directly on the block chain, though if a proposal contained a 
significant amount of data, that could contribute to the problem of “block chain bloat.” See generally 
Daniel Cawrey, Why New Forms of Spam Could Bloat Bitcoin’s Block Chain, COINDESK (Sept. 3, 
2014), http://www.coindesk.com/new-forms-spam-bloat-bitcoins-block-chain/  (discussing the 
bloat problem). 
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 See HENRY MARTYN ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER 371-75 (Sarah Corbin Robert et al. 
eds., 11th ed. 1970).  
183
 For an analysis of how Robert’s Rules could be adapted to an online setting, see Phil Reiman, In 
Congress Electric: The Need for On-Line Parliamentary Procedure, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 963 (2000).  
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might not make sense to accept Change X yet because it makes sense for Change Y 
to be considered, either because Change Y is more important, or because Change Y 
was developed earlier and might affect the desirability of Change X. Often, it will 
make sense to achieve group consensus on a general principle for proceeding before 
full development of that principle into code. And so a proposal to allow a particular 
change might fail at one time but succeed later.  
Similarly, the normative case for creating a new version of a repository 
might be weak at one time but stronger a few weeks later, when more time had 
passed from the previous version and more testing has taken place. Peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking may be more chaotic than a structured meeting with a recognized 
chair, but it should be able to resolve issues in a reasonable order. A peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking mechanism also might support group decisions on whether to 
change the time at which a particular decision is to be resolved. This would reduce 
the risk associated with supporting or opposing a proposal, because decisionmakers 
on the primary question could focus on the overall merits of the question, while 
others could focus on questions of timing. 
Software tools could be developed that would automatically update 
repositories based on determinations in the block chain. But this is not essential. 
What is essential is the general acceptance of the principle that the block chain, 
pursuant to the decisionmaking mechanism described above or some other peer-to-
peer mechanism, determines the software. This completes a circle: The Bitcoin 
protocol determines the block chain, and the block chain determines the Bitcoin 
protocol. The existence of this circle would enable evolution both with respect to 
the rules determining the authoritative block chain (for example, if decisionmakers 
incorporated a proof-of-stake component into Bitcoin) and the rules governing the 
determination of what counts as an authoritative decision (for example, the 
mechanics of the formal tacit coordination game).  
The possibility of changing the decisionmaking process may decrease the 
chance of total rejection of the decisionmaking system. But such rejection will 
always be possible. Anyone can always make a normative argument that other 
participants in an open-source software project should use some version of the 
software other than the officially sanctioned one, or that one set of agreed-upon 
rules should be disregarded in favor of another set, regardless of their respective 
pedigrees. Establishing a peer-to-peer system for making decisions, however, can 
provide perceived legitimacy to the corresponding software repositories, at least if 
peer-to-peer decisionmaking came to be accepted over time. It would seem strange 
for someone to advocate immediate change to some alternative software repository 
not recognized by the official process, simultaneously repudiating both the 
decisionmaking rules and the decisions made pursuant to those rules. Constitutional 
law analogously often successfully channels demand for change into either calls for 
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changes consistent with the constitution or for changes to the constitution, typically 
pursuant to the provisions set forth by the constitution itself.184 
Decisions might be made to entrench some rules of decision or some aspects 
of the Bitcoin protocol by establishing a higher threshold of decision,185 thus 
creating a form of higher-order law analogous to constitutional law. This provides 
a possible response to a plausible objection to using peer-to-peer decisionmaking 
for Bitcoin in particular. One feature of Bitcoin trumped by some advocates is that 
there is no central bank deciding on monetary policy, because the schedule of 
Bitcoins to be produced was fixed at the outset.186 People will be more comfortable 
holding Bitcoin, the argument goes, knowing that this serves as a check against 
inflation. The argument is similar to that offered by those, most notably Milton 
Friedman,187 who argue that monetary policy should be conducted according to 
rules set forth in advance. There are familiar rebuttals that can be adapted to Bitcoin, 
that the ability to determine the course of growth of the currency would make it 
possible to adapt to unexpected needs.188 If, however, flexibility in decisionmaking 
would produce too much inflation, the Bitcoin mining schedule could be made 
unchangeable or difficult to change change.  
Creation of higher-order principles is not a foolproof safeguard against 
change, because there could be a decision to change a higher-order decision.189 
                                                 
184
 In the United States, legal change is manifested in statutes or in constitutional amendments under 
Article V of the Constitution. It remains possible, however, that the people could reject the 
Constitution, and Akhil Amar has argued that the Constitution specifically recognizes the right of 
the people to do so. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). 
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 For example, a proposal might require that two-thirds of money placed down be in favor of 
changes, if those changes affected certain documents or code sections in the repository. This would 
decrease the potential gains from supporting such a change. One could also imagine a provision 
simply requiring some high standard, such as “very high confidence,” for certain types of changes. 
The peer-to-peer decisionmakers would then decide whether the particular proposal met that high 
standard.  
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 See, e.g., How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:50 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-does-
bitcoin-work; supra note 84. 
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 See Milton Friedman, Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 
98, 100-01 (1982) (discussing the rules that should be adopted to manage monetary policy). 
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 See, e.g., Scott Sumner, In Defense of a Flexible Monetary Policy, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 
2013), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/11/08/scott-sumner/defense-flexible-monetary-policy. 
189
 An analogy in American constitutional law might be a change to the representation of states in 
the Senate. The Constitution guards against this change even by constitutional amendment. See U.S. 
CONST. art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate.”). Some observers, however, have argued that it would be possible first to amend the 
Constitution to remove the obstacle to this type of amendment to the Constitution, and then to amend 
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Arguably, however, such a higher-order decision could provide better protection 
against inflation than the existing decisionmaking system. After all, there is nothing 
to stop the software developers of the official Bitcoin repository from changing the 
schedule at which Bitcoins can be released, other than the possibility that others 
will reject the authoritativeness of their repository. The most plausible clash of 
competing interests foreseeable for Bitcoin is the possibility that miners will 
demand greater rents, whether in the form of additional Bitcoin mining allowances 
or in the form of transaction fees. This would provide some benefit to the public, 
by increasing the cost to mounting a 51% attack.190 But miners’ interest will be in 
higher rents than the public would favor. The miners could claim to be the authentic 
representatives of the Bitcoin community and reject the official software repository. 
Faced with a credible threat of a hard fork, those who control the central repository 
seem likely to give into the miners’ position, at least partly. Current developers may 
insist that they act solely on the basis of consensus, but the drastic future reduction 
in the issuance of new Bitcoins means that transaction fees will have to increase at 
least somewhat, and given differing interests, consensus as to how great the 
increase is seems unlikely. The most probable outcome will be quite close to the 
interests of the miners. 
Creation of a peer-to-peer decisionmaking system could help avoid this 
outcome. If formal tacit coordination games became the accepted mechanism for 
determining change to the Bitcoin protocol, there would remain the possibility of 
tacitly coordinating around some other result. For example, peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking could decide against minimum transaction fees, but if most miners 
acted as if blocks with transactions below some hypothetical minimum were 
invalid, the Bitcoin protocol effectively would insist on transaction fees. But such 
coordination might be more difficult than it would be absent a formal mechanism 
for making decisions about the protocol. Miners seeking to coordinate amongst 
themselves to create minimum transaction fees would be not merely advocating 
that policy but also advocating rejection of the entire peer-to-peer decisionmaking 
system and replacement with some other system. This makes the change more 
radical and thus more difficult to tacitly coordinate upon.  
The greatest challenge for peer-to-peer decisionmaking may be the 
difficulty of initiating it, even with gradual introduction. Miners, of course, would 
be able to see that such a system might lead in the long term to the reduction of 
their power. They might therefore resist peer-to-peer decisionmaking, likely 
focusing on legitimate concerns such as that it has not sufficiently been tested. As 
long as the Bitcoin software developers proceed truly by consensus, it is unlikely 
                                                 
the Constitution either to change the representation of states in the Senate or to allow subsequent 
legislation to do so. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 
CONST. COMMENTARY 481, 486 n.14 (1997). 
190
 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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to be adopted. But if the developers did gradually institute such a system, the miners 
today might not yet have sufficient incentive to risk a hard fork of the currency. 
After all, any long-term adverse consequences for the miners might be years away, 
and the rents for miners so far in the future will likely be dissipated by hardware 
investments in the interim. Today, there is probably sufficient tacit coordination 
around a particular software repository that a decision by developers to move 
gradually to a system that eliminates the need for such a repository would not create 
so much resistance as to destabilize the currency. Perhaps the greater obstacle, then, 
might be among the software developers themselves, who might prefer to control 
the main repository than to have peer-to-peer decisionmaking. 
C. Rewarding Institution-Promoting Activities 
The two examples detailed above illustrate that peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking can be used both for binary decisions and for decisions about 
whether to accept and change a particular text or code. Another type of decision is 
a quantity decision. Legal systems frequently make quantity decisions, for example 
when juries decide how much damages to award a plaintiff in a case in which the 
defendant has been found liable. Bitcoin or some other peer-to-peer institution, 
meanwhile, might wish to implement a more robust decentralized fisc. Bitcoin’s 
mining mechanism, we have seen, provides rewards only for a particular type of 
activity providing benefits to the Bitcoin community, mining.191 Most institutions, 
however, choose to spend money on a variety of purposes, so a mechanism for 
committing to spend money or rewarding activities undertaken on behalf of an 
institution could be central to some peer-to-peer decisionmaking institutions.  
Bitcoin itself might benefit if rewards were available for other activities 
benefiting Bitcoin. For example, one might argue that Bitcoin should reward those 
who make significant contributions to the code base. Some claim that there are not 
enough volunteers interested in working on low-level aspects of the code.192 
Monetary payment might be counterproductive by making individuals less likely 
to make altruistic contributions,193 but for some types of contributions with less 
inherent interest, monetary payment might be useful. Or, perhaps it makes sense to 
reward commitments to help stabilize the currency by buying at least a certain 
amount of the currency should its value on exchanges fall below a certain level. Or, 
perhaps businesses that enable Bitcoin payment or developers of services 
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 See supra Part I.C. 
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 See Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Core Development Falling Behind, Warns Bitcoinj’s Mike Hearn, 
COINDESK (Feb. 24, 2014 at 5:57 GMT), at http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-core-development-
falling-behind-warns-mike-hearn/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 101, at 378 (explaining that monetary rewards may reduce 
contributions in peer production). 
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complementary to Bitcoin should receive some grant subsidy as a means of further 
extending Bitcoin. Bitcoin could establish policies allowing or prohibiting 
payments for different classes of contributions, and then where permitted, use 
quantity decisions to determine the size of contributions.  
 The existing approaches to decisionmaking could easily be used to make 
quantity decisions. Numbers can be represented in binary form, so a group of binary 
decisions could be used to make a quantity decision. One binary decision could 
represent a single unit; another, two units; another, four units; and so forth, with 
decisions on the largest conceivable numbers of units being resolved first. The text 
decisionmaking approach could work as well. A text, after all, could consist simply 
of a number, and user proposals to change the number would be assessed with the 
same decisionmaking approach described above for changes to the reference 
code.194 A number likely would become more refined over time, as preliminary 
decisions on an approximate level would not be revisited in fixing on a final value. 
It would also be possible to design peer-to-peer decisionmaking processes 
geared specifically to decisionmaking about quantities. For example, given a need 
to reach agreement on a quantity such as a reward, one participant could propose a 
particular number by sending a proposal fee to an address in a transaction indicating 
in metadata the purpose of the payment. The metadata would also contain the 
participant’s proposal of a certain number. Another participant might then propose 
a different number by paying the same amount or a higher amount to the same 
address, with metadata specifying the new number proposal, and subsequent 
participants could do the same. Each new proposal amounts to a bet with the prior 
proposing participant that the new participant’s proposal will be closer to the final 
number than the prior participant’s. The size of this bet is the amount of the prior 
participant’s bet, after deducting the amount that the prior participant had bet with 
the participant before that. The tacit coordination game is thus much like the earlier 
ones, with each participant considering what participants will decide in the future. 
The decision can be deemed final once a sufficient period elapses either with no 
proposals or with volatility in the most recent proposal below some predetermined 
threshold.195  
For example, suppose A proposes 15 with 1 Bitcoin, B proposes 30 with 2 
Bitcoin, C proposes 20 with 3 Bitcoin, and D proposes 40 with 3 Bitcoin. If D’s 
transaction is the last one, then B would have won its 1 Bitcoin bet with A, C would 
have lost its 1 Bitcoin bet with B (i.e., the 2 Bitcoin that B invested minus the 1 
Bitcoin of that which corresponded to B’s investment with A), and D would have 
won its 2 Bitcoin bet with C (i.e., 3 Bitcoin – 1 Bitcoin that C bet B). The remaining 
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 See supra Part II.B. 
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 Volatility might be measured, for example, as the standard deviation of the most recent proposal 
at the time each block is added to the block chain for the most recent 100 blocks. The threshold 
could be defined by the protocol.  
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investment, D’s extra 1 Bitcoin, would be refunded, as would winning bets. There 
is, of course, some risk of simultaneous transactions (suppose B1 and B2 
simultaneously challenge A), but the protocol could resolve which block should be 
considered authoritative in this case. For example, if a block contained multiple 
challenges to a particular transaction, then the block with the greatest challenge 
amount could control, and the other transaction would be void;196 if the amounts 
were equal, then the block that appears earliest in the block chain would be 
authoritative.  
It might seem that there is a flaw in this scheme, and indeed the flaw may 
exist to some extent in the earlier proposals as well. The flaw is that there may be 
no incentive for the first participant, A in the above example, to pay the proposal 
fee. Once A pays the proposal fee, a subsequent participant will challenge whenever 
it expects to be able to improve on the estimate more than some hypothetical 
subsequent participant could improve on its own estimate. But A will have no 
incentive, unless A has some intrinsic interest in the question at hand. If resolution 
of the quantity decision is important for peer-to-peer governance, then, it may make 
sense for the peer-to-peer institution to cover some portion of the proposal fee as a 
means of subsidizing the decisionmaking. Similarly, it may make sense to cover 
some portion of any increase in the amount at stake. It’s not inherently obvious, 
however, how large any such reward should be. So, one could use peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking to determine the size of the reward on some other question being 
resolved by peer-to-peer decisionmaking.  
The recursion inherent in this can be resolved by providing for some default 
reward proportion to be paid unless someone pays a proposal fee to initiate 
decisionmaking on some other reward proportion. For example, we might imagine 
a default reward proportion of 0. Suppose that A initiates a decisionmaking, urging 
that a reward be paid to some Bitcoin owner on account of that Bitcoin owner’s 
work promoting Bitcoin. A thus pays a proposal fee of, say, a mandated 1 Bitcoin. 
The Bitcoin owner might be A itself, or might not be. Either during or after the 
process of determining the reward to be paid, someone might propose some reward 
to A to offset some or all of the expense of the proposal fee. The proposer of this 
reward might be A as well, or might be someone else willing to pay the proposal 
fee, with a lower mandate of, say, 0.1 Bitcoin, since the stakes will be lower. In 
principle, someone could initiate yet another decisionmaking process to offset a 
portion of the 0.1 Bitcoin proposal fee by paying a proposal fee at some pre-
established minimum level, though at some point, the level of recursion will be 
such that participants are likely to reject the proposal.  
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III. THE POSSIBILITIES AND PERILS OF PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE 
A cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Part I showed, can perform the central 
tasks of traditional institutions—maintaining a ledger, spending money, and 
making decisions—peer-to-peer, though in a constrained way. Incorporating formal 
tacit coordination games into a cryptocurrency, we saw in Part II, can allow for a 
more flexible decisionmaking apparatus. Nonetheless, if peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking were limited to cryptocurrencies, it would hold relatively little 
interest for legal theorists, other than perhaps those specialized in specific types of 
financial institutions or transactions. This Article has focused on cryptocurrencies, 
however, only because they are a central building block for any peer-to-peer 
institution. Naturally, we should not expect or want peer-to-peer decisionmaking to 
take over our central democratic institutions. But it is possible that peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking could assume niche responsibilities, most obviously in private law 
contexts, but perhaps in public law as well. 
A. Peer-to-Peer Arbitration 
Perhaps the most obvious application of peer-to-peer decisionmaking would 
be as a form of arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties can 
voluntarily by contract use private arbitrators to resolve their disputes, and the 
federal courts will honor those private resolutions.197 The courts have interpreted 
the Act broadly, including for example by allowing arbitration provisions in 
contracts of adhesion to preclude class-action litigation.198 At least one 
commentator considering the possibility of online arbitration has argued that online 
arbitration would be permissible.199 The vision for such arbitration, however, is not 
of a peer-to-peer institution, but simply of arbitrators, chosen either by the parties 
or by the arbitration agency, using technology such as chat rooms or 
videoconference to lower some of the transaction costs associated with arbitration. 
Peer-to-peer arbitration could represent a far greater departure from existing 
litigation and arbitration. First, peer-to-peer arbitration by definition would not 
require the selection of particular arbitrators. Second, such arbitration could avoid 
the need for legal enforcement of judgments (and the danger that the courts might 
refuse to honor peer-to-peer arbitration decisions, for example on the theory that 
they violate due process rights)200 if the arbitration is used simply to resolve disputes 
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 See supra note 22. 
198
 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011) (voiding inconsistent state statutes). 
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 See Frank A. Cona, Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. 
L. REV. 975 (1997). 
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over funds placed in escrow. If possession is nine-tenths the law,201 then courts are 
unlikely to interfere with the outcome of a self-executing peer-to-peer arbitration. 
Third, peer-to-peer arbitration would not require formalized rules governing the 
presentation or consideration of evidence or arguments. Once a party initiates the 
decisionmaking process, participants would consider whatever evidence they 
considered relevant. The litigants would have some incentives to release 
information that benefited their respective cases and potentially even information 
that hurt their cases if that information is actually less harmful than decisionmakers 
would think in the event release were refused.202 
 It might seem that an absence of procedural rules would be a serious 
disadvantage of peer-to-peer arbitration. Some rules may be unnecessary or less 
necessary with peer-to-peer decisionmaking. Rules of jurisdiction203 and associated 
doctrines, such as venue204 and forum non conveniens,205 determine the court in 
which a lawsuit should be filed. In a peer-to-peer arbitration, there is no need to 
select a particular arbitrator or arbitration forum for peer-to-peer decisionmaking, 
because anyone may participtae. Other rules, such as provisions allowing for 
hearings, help ensure that judges cannot shirk from the task of hearing and 
evidence. Peer-to-peer arbitration, by contrast, provides financial incentives for 
careful consideration.206 Still other rules, especially those that allow appeal, help 
                                                 
questions about whether peer-to-peer decisionmaking offends due process is likely to be pragmatic. 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 U.S. 893, 907-909 (1976), recognizes that due process is highly context-
specific and considers factors including the risk of error and the costs and burdens of procedures. 
The resolution of a due process inquiry would thus likely depend in part on an empirical assessment, 
either rigorous or anecdotal, of the peer-to-peer decisionmaking. 
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 See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 
CONN. L.REV. 605, 605 (2005). 
202
 Economists have recognized that incentives to release information can be powerful when 
inferences will be drawn from refusal to release the information. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30-31 (1986) (“[R]ational 
skepticism by a decisionmaker can lead to a full-information decision by inducing one party to 
reveal information that is damaging to its interests. The party reveals this information for fear that 
withholding it will lead to an even more unfavorable supposition by the skeptical decisionmaker.”). 
203
 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (introducing the modern 
framework for personal jurisdiction); U.S. CONST. art. III (limiting federal courts’ subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
204
 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (setting forth the federal venue rules). 
205
 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (developing federal version of 
doctrine). 
206
 Hearings and trials may also serve a psychological function, helping satisfy litigants’ desire that 
someone consider their perspective. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). It is an empirical question how peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking would compare in imparting a sense of procedural justice. One might assume that 
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prevent idiosyncratic decisionmaking by a single individual and ensure that the law 
is followed. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking involves multiple decisionmakers, thus 
reducing the risk of idiosyncratic judgment, though perhaps exacerbating the risk 
that decisionmakers might consider factors not strictly relevant from a legal 
standpoint.207 
 The ultimate question is the empirical and subjective one of whether peer-
to-peer arbitration, whether procedure-free or with a well-developed set of 
procedural rules (perhaps created by peer-to-peer decisionmaking itself, resolving 
issues such as time limits for a defendant to answer a plaintiff’s complaint208), 
would be superior to a more traditional system of adjudication or arbitration. It is 
impossible to take a firm position on this. The experiment seems a worthwhile one, 
if the worth of an experiment is measured by the degree of uncertainty as to its 
outcome. Perhaps peer-to-peer arbitration would be cheaper than traditional 
arbitration, both because of saved transport costs and because of the expense 
associated with formal proceedings, but this is not guaranteed. Maybe peer-to-peer 
arbitration will lead to more predictable decisions, because no single person will 
control the outcome. It is also possible, though, that freedom from legal constraints 
will add randomness and arbitrariness.  
The care that peer-to-peer decisionmaking participants take in their 
evaluation of evidence would depend partly on the protocol rules. The larger the 
peer-to-peer proposal fee,209 the greater the incentive that peer-to-peer 
decisionmakers will have to educate themselves. Who should pay the fee and how 
large it should be is a question alien to public adjudication, where taxpayers 
subsidize the courts,210 but familiar in the arbitration context, because arbitrators 
must be paid.211 One might use peer-to-peer decisionmaking to set the size of the 
                                                 
peer-to-peer decisionmaking would be inferior because of a lack of in-person contact, but trial is so 
rare in civil adjudication that the benefits of in-person contact cannot be a primary benefit of the 
system. See generally Mark Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
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that judges similarly have difficulty ignoring inadmissible evidence). 
208
 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1) (providing similar time limits). 
209
 See supra Part II.A.2. 
210
 See Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good? “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private 
Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899 (2013) (arguing that some 
parties should have to pay market rates for adjudication provision). 
211
 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
729, 736-43 (2006) (discussing arbitration fees). 
  PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE     52 
 
 
   
 
fee, to be paid by the plaintiff. The size should depend on the marginal benefit of 
increased adjudication accuracy. Our litigation system contains only relatively 
crude mechanisms for adjusting the amount spent to judge cases based on the 
amount at stake, such as the existence of separate courts for small claims.212 Judges 
are likely to use their discretion to spend more time on more important matters,213 
but no financial incentives drive this result. With peer-to-peer arbitration, one’s 
incentives to invest in researching a case will be proportional to the probability that 
one will conclude that prior participants have not fully taken factors into 
consideration and to the proposal fee. 
Peer-to-peer decisionmaking also could be used to affect litigants’ 
investment incentives. For example, peer-to-peer decisionmaking similarly might 
be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether one side must reimburse 
the other for their legal fees or other expenses, based on factors such as whether the 
case was close.214 Perhaps to avoid idiosyncratic decisionmaking on such issues, 
legal systems generally do not allow case-specific inquiries about fee shifting.215 
Moreover, our litigation system generally makes no attempt to limit parties’ 
spending on developing reasonable legal arguments.216 Because each party will not 
take into account the effect of its spending on the welfare of its opponent, the result 
is likely to be excessive spending, relative to the amount that the parties ideally 
would spend ex post to make the contract efficient ex ante. Arbitrators or judges 
could be empowered to levy fines for excessive legal investment, but we would be 
hesitant to place such discretion in individuals, especially if there is a danger that 
they might use this power to shirk on their own work.  
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Whether this would increase predictability of decisions and whether it 
would better control spending on arbitrations are empirical questions. The point 
here is simply that peer-to-peer arbitration is not just arbitration moved onto the 
Internet, but a different form of decisionmaking with strengths different from those 
of conventional arbitration and litigation.  
B. A Peer-to-Peer Trust 
If peer-to-peer arbitration can serve as a means of producing relatively 
predictable decisions relatively cheaply, then it could in turn serve as the foundation 
for a peer-to-peer trust.217 A settlor would establish the trust by a transaction that 
would send Bitcoin to an address from which it could not be spent by ordinary 
means.218 Metadata for the transaction would indicate the purpose of the trust and 
circumstances in which the trust could be disbursed.219 At any later point, someone 
could pay at least a minimum proposal fee, which could be established by the trust, 
to initiate a request for funding for the trust. Requests for discretionary funds might 
require higher proposal fees than requests for nondiscretionary payments. This 
would initiate a peer-to-peer arbitration to resolve whether a payout should occur 
and, if so, the size of the payout that should be granted. The peer-to-peer arbitration 
could also consider whether any part of the proposal fee or other payments made 
during the arbitration process by participants should be refunded from the trust. 
New currency could then be issued in the amount specified and awarded to the 
public address of the party applying for a payment. 
The Bitcoin protocol would need to recognize that when an adjudication 
concluded with a decision to make a payout, the payout should result in the creation 
of new currency in the specified amount. In theory, one could bake into the protocol 
itself a rule that total payouts from a trust cannot exceed the amount paid into the 
trust, but it is also possible for the protocol simply to allow peer-to-peer decisions 
to create new currency. This would thus delegate to the peer-to-peer 
decisionmakers the task of ensuring that excessive payments are not made. If peer-
to-peer decisionmaking can be used to pay out arbitrary rewards for those who help 
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promote a currency,220 then it should also be possible to use such decisionmaking 
to pay out arbitrary amounts for other purposes. If the general mechanism of formal 
tacit coordination games works for subjective decisionmaking, it should work as 
well for questions with objective answers (such as whether a trust has sufficient 
funds remaining to support a request), particularly because participants could 
program computer-based agents to participate in decisionmaking to support 
objective rules. This should be profitable if one anticipates that the focal point 
solution will be to enforce such rules. In principle, peer-to-peer decisionmaking 
also could be used to undo mistakes of peer-to-peer decisionmaking, but objective 
errors seem highly unlikely in any event. 
The potential efficiency benefit from a peer-to-peer trust is that it might 
lower transaction costs. In 1984, John Langbein argued that the high transactions 
costs associated with the probate system had led to an increased reliance on 
techniques for transferring assets without resort to probate.221 For example, life 
insurance proceeds and pension accounts name specific beneficiaries, who can 
receive the relevant funds without direct legal intervention.222 Probate continues to 
perform a critical function in clearing title for real property, but there are means 
sometimes to evade even this, and personal property is often distributed without 
judicial intervention.223 Meanwhile, secured lending allows creditors to resolve 
most loans without probate.224 The reason that all of these mechanisms are preferred 
to probate is that “[t]he probate system,” Langbein explained, “has earned a 
lamentable reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, makework, and worse.”225  
Conventional nonprobate transfers, however, are also not without 
transactions costs. Daniel Kelly notes that the combination of a will and a revocable 
trust will generally involve greater ex ante transactions costs than creation of a will 
alone.226 “Moreover,” he argues, “a settlor who creates a trust may have to perform 
additional tasks like transferring assets into the trust or changing beneficiary 
designations.”227 Transactions costs are likely to be especially large when the 
grantor wishes to impose subjective conditions on distribution of trust funds. For 
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example, a common trust provision allows for funds to be used only for purposes 
such as education or health.228 A trustee will then be needed to determine whether 
particular claims for payment should be honored. In the case of bad faith or serious 
abuse, the courts can remove a trustee.229 Even short of that, refusals to make 
payouts can lead to lawsuits.230 A lawsuit may demand correction of an 
overpayment,231 and so trustees historically have been conservative in authorizing 
payments.232 A trust can grant a trustee “absolute” or “uncontrolled” discretion, but 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides that “[t]hese words are not interpreted 
literally.”233 “It is a matter of interpretation,” the Restatement explains, “to 
determine the degree to which a settlor’s use of language of extended discretion 
(e.g., ‘absolute discretion’) manifests an intention to modify the normal duties of 
the trustee and the normal grounds of judicial intervention in the exercise of a 
discretionary power.”234 A settlor thus cannot definitively avoid judicial 
interference and its attendant costs. 
There are thus at least two possible benefits to a peer-to-peer trust that could 
lead settlors to prefer such a mechanism to either probate or a conventional 
nonprobate trust. First, creation costs could be quite low, since few or no formalities 
would be required. The only requirement would be making a cryptocurrency 
payment with sufficient metadata so that the purpose of the payment could be 
ascertained. Second, the peer-to-peer trust would rely on peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking, which might be cheaper than a conventional trustee. A 
conventional trustee will have to charge enough money to cover the risks associated 
with being a trustee, including the possibility that the trustee will be found to have 
acted in bad faith and required to replenish the trust.235 The peer-to-peer trust could 
allow a settlor to prevent judicial interference with the trust’s decisionmaking. A 
settlor might wish to do this if the settlor is sufficiently confident in the peer-to-
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peer decisionmaking process. This is not for everyone. Judicial trust supervision 
provides benefits. But just as nonprobate transfers have allowed an end run around 
perceived inefficiencies of probate law, so too could cryptocurrency trusts allow an 
end run around perceived inefficiencies of conventional trusts. A cryptocurrency 
trust thus serves a niche for those who believe that they face high transactions costs 
with conventional trusts. 
C. A Peer-to-Peer Bank 
The peer-to-peer trust, as described so far, lacks one common feature: the 
ability to invest trust funds. The trust money is set aside until the money is needed, 
so the investment is ultimately in the cryptocurrency itself, rather than in a 
diversified form. Ideally, it would be beneficial for the trustee to be able to invest 
deposited Bitcoins pending trust withdrawals to grow the trust corpus. This is, of 
course, possible with conventional trust relationships. The trustee simply relies on 
a financial institution such as a bank or mutual fund, depositing the trust moneys 
and then withdrawing them as needed. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could support 
mechanisms for deciding when cryptocurrency should be exchanged for other 
assets controlled by a bank. The challenge for a cryptocurrency is how to execute 
that exchange. The problem is that there is no mechanism allowing cryptocurrency 
accounts to own virtual assets. For a peer-to-peer institution to own assets besides 
virtual currency, some interface is needed between the virtual and real worlds. 
A cryptocurrency bank can establish this connection. The bank would serve 
the role of a trusted intermediary. Potential depositors would need to decide 
whether to trust any bank, based on its track record and any assurances it might 
provide with regard to its security practices and its financial practices. Early 
experiments with Bitcoin banks have not inspired confidence, with at least two 
major bank failures from apparent failures to safeguard Bitcoins.236 But it seems 
plausible that a bank might establish a reputation over time. Even a wholly 
anonymous bank might inspire trust so long as the present discounted value of 
expected bank profits is greater than the benefit to the bank of stealing deposits. It 
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is more plausible, though, that trust could be achieved through transparency, with 
identification of the bank owners, so that they might face criminal liability should 
they steal money and at least reputational sanctions should they fail to safeguard it.  
A cryptocurrency bank operating in this way is not a peer-to-peer bank. A 
virtual currency operated by a trusted intermediary is not a peer-to-peer institution; 
indeed, the purpose of Bitcoin was to offer a peer-to-peer alternative to the trusted 
intermediary approach. A bank that serves as a trusted intermediary will maintain 
its own centralized records and management. Deposits into and withdrawals from 
the bank might be conducted entirely by Bitcoin and thus appear on the block chain, 
but if the bank itself is chartered in some jurisdiction, then it is not peer-to-peer. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider the role that cryptocurrency banks might 
have in supporting peer-to-peer institutions, along with the danger that such banks 
might support criminal activity, before considering the possibility of a true peer-to-
peer bank. 
A cryptocurrency bank, in principle, could hold accounts in the name of 
cryptocurrency public keys. For example, a peer-to-peer decision might be to place 
a trust corpus into a particular cryptocurrency bank. The bank would have released 
a public key corresponding to an account it controls, and the peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking process could result in new currency then being assigned to this 
public key to offset the funds placed into trust. The owner of the private key (the 
bank) could do with this currency what it wished, including swapping the 
cryptocurrency for ordinary currency via an exchange.237 It thus would be able to 
place funds into traditional investments. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could result 
in a withdrawal decision, and the bank would then be expected to send 
cryptocurrency back to the trust. Presumably, a failure to do so would mean that 
peer-to-peer decisionmakers would not use that bank in the future. 
 Just as peer-to-peer arbitration or a peer-to-peer trust could offer lower 
transaction fees than traditional equivalents, so too might a cryptocurrency bank 
reduce transaction fees. But the principal reason that this is so is that a 
cryptocurrency bank might more easily escape regulation. If it becomes easy for 
individuals or organizations to move their funds to cryptocurrency, and they can 
anonymously move cryptocurrency to bank accounts, they may be able to opt out 
of bank regulation. One motivation for this is that bank regulation is expensive. 
Theorists justify the expense on the grounds that it benefits depositors238 and 
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contributes to macroeconomic stability,239 though some individual depositors might 
prefer banks with less regulation. Another motivation for cryptocurrency banking 
would be to facilitate crimes such as tax evasion and money laundering.240 
 An anonymous cryptocurrency bank likely could not easily be regulated, 
assuming the cryptocurrency has sufficient privacy protections, because there 
would be no way of identifying the owners of the bank. But an anonymous bank 
will have a harder time drawing in cryptocurrency customers. Banks that seek to 
bolster their credibility by being public can be regulated in the countries in which 
they are located. It only takes one country to create an offshore banking haven. 
Such a jurisdiction would likely want to regulate such banks somewhat, to assure 
depositors, but might offer minimal regulation and maximal privacy protection. 
Cryptocurrency makes it more difficult to pressure a jurisdiction into cooperating 
with international transparency laws designed to deter money laundering. Existing 
financial regulation can target offshore banking by the indirect means of regulating 
transfers between offshore banks and ordinary banks.241 One could, however, 
transfer cryptocurrency directly to a cryptocurrency bank in such a haven.  
Countries such as the United States could attack cryptocurrency banks in 
one of two ways. First, they might put pressure on the haven jurisdiction. Second, 
they might seek to regulate transactions in which individuals purchase 
cryptocurrencies, demanding disclosure of their identities, and then seek to regulate 
those individuals. Authorities might, for example, regulate cryptocurrency ATMs, 
which in principle can make it easy to exchange cash and cryptocurrency 
anonymously. But it may be more difficult to regulate black markets.242 As long as 
individuals can buy and sell cryptocurrency with fiat currency, cryptocurrency 
banks will be difficult to regulate. 
It may seem that our focus so far on cryptocurrency banks that are trusted 
intermediaries rather than truly peer-to-peer undermines the argument that it is 
possible to imagine robust peer-to-peer institutions. If one must rely on a trusted 
intermediary model to create a cryptocurrency bank, then perhaps true peer-to-peer 
institutions are impossible. The obstacle, however, is solely a legal one: A fully 
functional bank must be able to own real assets, since a primary function of a bank 
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is to invest funds. A peer-to-peer institution could own assets only if the legal 
system recognized the peer-to-peer institution as legitimately existing and having a 
form of personhood sufficient for the ownership of property. Real property 
purchased by a trust, for example, might be held in the name of the public key or in 
the name of the cryptocurrency as a whole.  
Recognition of such ownership may seem unlikely, because of concerns that 
cryptocurrency ownership might facilitate illegal activity by providing anonymity. 
But a refusal to allow cryptocurrency ownership because of discomfort with 
cryptocurrencies would be self-defeating. Trusted intermediaries would still exist 
in other jurisdictions, and so cryptocurrencies would remain helpful for money 
laundering. Meanwhile, a refusal to allow ownership would impede legitimate 
cryptocurrency transactions and reduce the government’s ability to regulate peer-
to-peer banks or other peer-to-peer institutions. If a peer-to-peer bank or customer 
fails to follow applicable regulations, then the legal system could seize assets 
owned by the peer-to-peer institution. The legal system would need to develop 
principles for regulating such property seizure. For example, the legal system would 
need to assess when property ownership made a particular cryptocurrency account 
or cryptocurrency amenable to jurisdiction, addressing such timeless questions as 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction could be predicated solely on the basis of 
property ownership.243 However those questions are resolved, the legal system can 
regulate peer-to-peer institutions to the extent it permits them to own assets within 
its jurisdiction, but can do little about offshore trusted intermediaries that promote 
money laundering. 
D. A Peer-to-Peer Business Association 
A peer-to-peer bank is a specific realization of the more general concept of 
a peer-to-peer business association. The peer-to-peer bank accepts funds, makes 
investment decisions, and approves expenditures, and these are the general 
functions of any business association. We can thus imagine peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking being used to operate a peer-to-peer business association. The 
business might raise funds by soliciting contributions in Bitcoin or another 
cryptocurrency, make investment decisions, and ultimately pay dividends or 
liquidation funds to the investors. The business association might sue and be sued. 
A peer-to-peer business association would not be a sole proprietorship, partnership, 
limited liability company, or corporation, at least as traditionally conceived. The 
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traditional forms of business association differ in how they allocate ownership 
interests and decisionmaking authority, but the peer-to-peer business association 
allocates decisionmaking authority in a new way—not to a specific owner, to 
partners, to a Board, or even to shareholders, but to the peer-to-peer decisionmakers 
as a whole. 
Whether peer-to-peer business associations fill a niche depends on whether 
there are situations in which such associations minimize the sum of agency costs.244 
The agents of the business association would be the peer-to-peer decisionmakers 
who voluntarily participate in the tacit coordination game, for profit motive. Such 
decisionmakers might have less self-interest than managers or directors of a 
corporation, since the peer-to-peer decisionmakers would not receive a salary from 
the entity. This would help reduce agency costs. Of course, some individual 
decisionmakers might have some interest, for example in a contract that the peer-
to-peer business association might undertake, but to avoid losing money in the peer-
to-peer decisionmaking process, they would need to persuade others about the 
relevant corporate decision. Meanwhile, such decisionmakers might well have 
more information than shareholders, who often have little incentive to become 
informed about corporate affairs.245 How much incentive they have to acquire 
information—and whether they would have as much information as managers or 
directors—depends on the size of proposal fees and thus the subsidy for 
decisionmaking.246 
A limitation of peer-to-peer business associations is that their decisions 
would be inherently transparent. But there may be some industries in which 
transparent decisionmaking would furnish an advantage. For example, such 
decisionmaking might reassure potential contractual partners that they are not being 
taken advantage of. To the extent that secrecy in business affairs is needed, 
however, peer-to-peer decisionmakers could decide to hire employees, including 
executive managers, and allocate decisionmaking power to these managers, 
including the power to maintain information in confidence. The only decisions that 
thus must remain secret are the decisions by the peer-to-peer decisionmakers 
themselves. Of course, to the extent that peer-to-peer decisionmaking controls only 
who managers or directors are, the benefits as well as the costs of peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking would be reduced.  
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If the legal system were to recognize peer-to-peer business associations, a 
doctrinal question would be whether such business associations are entitled to 
limited liability.247 If granted limited liability, a peer-to-peer business association 
would still face seizure of property that it owned, but the owners of the business 
association would not face additional liability as a result of the business 
association’s actions. Given the ease with which business associations today can 
obtain limited liability, there appears to be little reason to resist limited liability for 
peer-to-peer business associations, other than resistance to the inherent idea of peer-
to-peer business associations. As a practical matter, defeating limited liability might 
be quite difficult anyway, because governmental authorities would have not be able 
to identify investors.  
 Once again, it might seem that peer-to-peer business associations are 
fanciful. But it would only take one jurisdiction to recognize such business 
associations for them to be able to contract business in multiple jurisdictions. Just 
as Delaware seeks to attract corporations to receive franchise tax revenue from 
them,248 so too could Delaware allow for the registration of peer-to-peer business 
associations, in exchange for payment of specified fees. If Delaware were 
uninterested in this business, another jurisdiction (such as Nevada, which recently 
tried to compete with Delaware for corporate charter business249) might do so. The 
jurisdiction might even call the peer-to-peer business association a “corporation.” 
Under current law, states may not discriminate against businesses incorporated in 
other states.250 Once registered or incorporated, such a business might be able to 
operate in other states in much the same way as other businesses.   
E. Peer-to-Peer Public Law 
Our examples of peer-to-peer decisionmaking have focused on private law 
for good reason. There are significant obstacles to private law peer-to-peer 
institutions, even placing aside the need for extension of Bitcoin or other 
cryptocurrency. One is the possibility that governmental hostility could prevent 
peer-to-peer institutions from owning real assets or that government might directly 
regulate or prohibit individuals from using vehicles such as peer-to-peer trusts. 
Perhaps one or more governments can be persuaded to tolerate such peer-to-peer 
                                                 
247
 Issues about the extent of limited liability similarly arose with the rise of limited liability 
companies. See, e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited 
Liability Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43 (1994). 
248
 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 999, 1012 (1994).  
249
 See Jill Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1067-68 (2000).  
250
 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1896).  
  PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE     62 
 
 
   
 
institutions. But it would be quite another large step before a government would 
embrace peer-to-peer decisionmaking for public purposes. The strongest reason to 
do so would be if existing governmental institutions are broken, for example 
because of corruption. The most likely area in which a peer-to-peer public 
institution might be created is central banking, though this too currently seems 
speculative. 
  
1. A Peer-to-Peer Central Bank 
A peer-to-peer central bank is the most obvious public institution that might 
be built on a cryptocurrency, because a cryptocurrency essentially performs the 
function of a central bank. A country could adopt Bitcoin or some new 
cryptocurrency as fiat currency. Bitcoin transactions are electronic, and so Bitcoin 
is an imperfect substitute for cash.251 But mobile phones are becoming ubiquitous 
even in the developing world.252 So, a country someday could decide to adopt a 
cryptocurrency as its fiat currency. The most obvious impetus to doing so would be 
a perception that the existing fiat currency has failed. This could occur if 
counterfeiting becomes widespread,253 but based on history, the more likely 
scenario is that the government has been unable to control inflation.  
The macroeconomics literature has highlighted that it often will make sense 
for a central bank to seek to “tie its hands” to prevent it from engineering inflation 
surprises in the future.254 The insight of this literature is that inflation can be a self-
fulfilling prophecy, with future inflation depending not only on future central bank 
actions but also no current (and future) expectations of inflation. And so, if a central 
bank has gotten in the habit of helping the government meet its bills and inflate 
away its debts by printing currency (or other mechanisms of expansive monetary 
policy), the public will anticipate that the central bank will continue to do so. The 
government may thus respond by hiring a new central banker with a reputation for 
inflation intolerance, who is more conservative about inflation than the government 
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itself.255 A more radical step is for a government to abandon its own currency and 
simply use a foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar.256 This can fix the inflation 
expectation problems, but it comes at a price: Monetary policy can no longer be 
used to address business cycle fluctuations.  
A country that merely adopted a fork of the current Bitcoin project would 
be solving its problem in a similar way. The growth rate of the new coins could be 
specified in advance, creating stable inflation expectations. This could be better 
than adopting a foreign currency, particularly if the country’s macroeconomic 
conditions are not likely to be correlated with those of the country whose currency 
otherwise would be adopted. Milton Friedman argued that a constant growth rate 
rule may be superior to an activist central bank with a country’s own interests in 
mind, 257 and a cryptocurrency can, like Bitcoin, insist on constant growth of the 
monetary supply. But for those who believe that a responsible central bank can 
exercise discretion responsibly,258 adopting a cryptocurrency with a mechanical 
mining schedule would be harmful.  
One economist, George Selgin, has considered the possibility that a central 
bank could adopt a cryptocurrency as a fiat currency.259 Recognizing the limitations 
of a constant growth rate rule, Selgin suggests that the currency might be “based 
upon a production ‘protocol’ such as might replicate the outcome of almost any 
conceivable monetary rule.”260 For example, he refers to Scott Sumner’s proposal 
for central banks to target nominal GDP, growing the currency just enough to keep 
nominal GDP growth rates constant.261 But Selgin does not explain precisely how 
this would work. The client software would need to be programmed with nominal 
GDP levels as an input. But there could be dispute about just what the nominal GDP 
levels are, and a government desiring to engineer inflation might prefer for the 
official nominal GDP levels to be artificially low, so that more currency would be 
produced. If the government controls a central repository for the client software, it 
would be able to do this easily. The government could also at any point change the 
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rule, abandoning nominal GDP targeting, by changing the client software. 
Anticipation of this would harm inflation expectations. 
A fiat cryptocurrency with a built-in peer-to-peer decisionmaking apparatus 
can allow for monetary policy tailored to a particular country’s needs. The 
cryptocurrency could be targeted at a variable like nominal GDP growth, with the 
cryptocurrency itself used to change the reference software to incorporate nominal 
GDP growth figures.262 Or, the currency production schedule could be specified 
numerically, with peer-to-peer decisionmaking used to make changes and thus to 
accomplish either expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. To avoid large 
rents for miners, a proof-of-stake approach might be used in lieu of proof of work.263 
There is always the danger that the government will abandon the currency for some 
other fiat currency.264 But changing currencies is more destabilizing than interfering 
with an existing currency, and if the existing currency has proven relatively 
successful, the short-term economic costs from changing currencies are likely to 
exceed the short-term benefits of being able to create inflation. 
2. Other Public Institutions 
A government might be willing to replace a public institution with a peer-
to-peer decisionmaking alternative only if several conditions are met. First, the 
institution must be one that seems clearly to be failing in achieving its core goals. 
Second, the peer-to-peer alternative must be seen as able to achieve the core goals 
of the institution. Third, the lack of direct governmental control over the peer-to-
peer institution must be viewed as beneficial. Fourth, it must be difficult for the 
government to interfere with the peer-to-peer institution, once it is established. 
Central banking plausibly could meet all of these conditions in a country with a 
history of failed monetary policy, particularly because the central function of a 
cryptocurrency is so close to that of a central bank. It seems far less likely for other 
public institutions, though perhaps it could become more plausible if peer-to-peer 
decisionmaking became familiar in private law contexts and successful for central 
banking. 
The obstacle to public institutions using peer-to-peer governance is not 
merely a practical one. Rather, it is a philosophical concern about the need for 
legitimacy of governmental authority. What creates the conditions for legitimacy is 
contested in the political philosophy literature. A tradition traceable to John Locke 
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emphasizes the significance of consent.265 Such approaches might tolerate peer-to-
peer decisionmaking, so long as the governed can be seen as consenting to it in 
particular contexts. Others emphasize the significance of representation,266 and it is 
difficult to make a case that peer-to-peer decisionmaking supports democratic 
participation or representation. A more recent theory, advanced by David Estlund, 
argues that democratic authority is based on epistemic proceduralism, which 
recognizes the tendency of democratic procedures to make correct decisions.267 This 
might seem to have greater potential to serve as a philosophical justification for 
peer-to-peer public institutions, yet Estlund seeks to justify democratic institutions 
even conceding ignorance and other weaknesses of voters and the possibility that 
there may be alternative approaches more likely to produce right answers.268 If peer-
to-peer institutions turn out to produce right answers more effectively than 
alternatives, an answer to Estlund will still be necessary before peer-to-peer 
institutions can be considered legitimate.269 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although there is a long history of debate about the degree to which 
government should be centralized,270 the legal literature has not previously 
questioned the premise that every legally authoritative action must come from some 
institution that is centralized. Even advocates of direct democracy imagine some 
centralized system for counting votes in such elections. Peer-to-peer systems lack 
a centralized server for recording information, but, as Bitcoin has shown, peer-to-
peer systems can still produce decisions about which there will be a high degree of 
consensus. The very limited form of decisionmaking inherent in Bitcoin could serve 
as a foundation for more sophisticated types of decisionmaking, allowing legal 
institutions to be created without voting or the designation of a central authority. 
The strongest case for application of such decisionmaking is for governance of 
Bitcoin itself, because the current governance arrangement means that Bitcoin is in 
important respects not peer-to-peer. Bitcoin could experiment with such 
governance by allowing decisions to be used merely as advice about whether 
software features should be implemented. Peer-to-peer law is likely to emerge 
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slowly and in unpredictable ways, but it has the potential to create authoritative 
decisions without authoritative decisionmakers. There may be decisive arguments 
against particular peer-to-peer institutions, but legal theorists should at least allow 
peer-to-peer institutions to join the menu of possible regulatory arrangements. 
 
